What\u27s So Bad About Bush v. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled Election by Seidman, Louis Michael
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2001 
What's So Bad About Bush v. Gore? An Essay on Our Unsettled 
Election 
Louis Michael Seidman 
Georgetown University Law Center, seidman@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/224 
 
47 Wayne L. Rev. 953-1026 (2001) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Courts Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2010 
 
 
 
What's So Bad About Bush v. Gore? 
An Essay on Our Unsettled Election 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Wayne L. Rev. 953-1026 (2001) 
 
 
Louis Michael Seidman 
Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
seidman@law.georgetown.edu 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/224/ 
 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 953 2001-2002
WHAT'S SO BAD ABOUT BUSH V. GORE? 
AN ESSAY ON OUR UNSETTLED ELECTION 
LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMANt 
Table of Contents 
I. IN'TR.ODuCTIoN ........ III III .................... III III III .. III ...... III ................ 953 
ll. TIm DECISION ................ III .................................... III ............ 964 
A. Prologue: How the Supreme Court Ran Out the Clock .. 964 
B. The Supreme Court's Frantic Search for a Constitutional 
Problem. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. III .. .. .. .. .... III .. .. III .. .. .. .. 971 
1. The Mythical Equal Protection Problem .......... 972 
2. The Mythical § 5 Deadline .....••............. 984 
3. The Mythical Article n Problem ..•............. 992 
m. THE DEEP POUTICS OF BUSH V. GORE • . . • • • • • • . . . . • 1005 
A. In Partial Defense of a Political Decision ..•........ 1005" 
B. Towardan Unsettled Constitution •. .....•........ 1019 
1. IN'TR.ODUCTION 
I voted for AI Gore. Although I was not an enthusiastic 
supponer, I thought that he was better than the available 
alternatives. I was sorry to see him lose. 
On the simplest level, then, what's bad about Bush v. Gore1 is 
that it put in place an administration that is bad for the 
country-indeed, disastrously bad in my view. Of course, this is not 
what people usually mean when they claim that the case was 
wrongly decided. But it turns out that it is harder than one might 
suppose to figure out what else is bad about Bush v. Gore. 
tprofessor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., 1968, 
University of Chicago;J.D., 1971, Harvard Law School. I am grateful to Michael 
Klarman, Mark Tushnet, Peter Rubin, Neal Katyal, Barry Friedman, Frank 
Michelman, Pamela Karlan, Daniel Farber, and Steven Goldberg, for their 
comments on an earlier draft. Roshini Thayaparan provided tireless and 
exceedingly helpful research assistance. 
1.531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
953 
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The problem is thrown into sharp relief by focusing on an 
embarrassing and obvious, if too little remarked upon, feature of 
the election debacle. Almost without exception, Bush supporters 
think that the decision was not bad at all. They believe that the 
recount procedures authorized by the Florida Supreme Court were 
unfair and illegal and that the United States Supreme Court's 
decision halting the recount was wise.2 Gore supporters, on the 
2. For a sampling of conservative legal academics who expressed this view, 
see Nelson Lund, An Act of Courage, THE WEEKLY STANDARD at 19 (DEC. 25, 
2000) (arguing that "Rather than take the easy way out, [the majority] 
courageously accepted their 'unsought responsibility' to require that the Florida 
court comply with the Constitutionj; CHARLES FRIED, AN UNREASONABLE 
REACTION TO A REASONABLE DECISION IN BUSHV. GoRE: THE QUESTION OF 
LEGITIMACY (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 2001) (forthcoming) [hereinafter 
Legitimacy] (arguing that case was correctly decided, although reasonable people 
might differ about its correctness); Gary C. Leedes, The Presidential Election Case: 
Remembering Safe Harbor Day, 35 U. RICH. L. REv. 237,245 (2001) (calling the 
majority opinion "a fair and balanced assessment of the applicable law"); Richard 
A. Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome 
in Bush v. GoreDefended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv: 613, 634 (2001) (arguing that "there 
is ample reason to believe ... that the Florida Supreme Court adopted, under the 
guise of interpretation, a scheme for conducting election challenges that deviates 
markedly from that which the Florida legislature had set out in its statutes"); 
Richard A. Posner, Bush v. Gore: Prolegomenon to an Assessment, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 719, 719 (2001) (arguing that there was "no basis in Florida law" for a 
recount); John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 
775, 776 (2001) ("Rather than acting hypocritically and lawlessly, the Court's 
decision to bring the Florida election dispute to a timely, and fmal, end not only 
restored stability to the political system but was also consistent with the 
institutional role the Court has shaped for itself over the last decade."). For some 
admirable, if partial, counterexamples of conservative scholars who expressed 
reservations about the decision, see Steven G. Calabresi, A Political Question 
(forthcoming) (arguing that the Supreme Court correctly decided the merits, but 
that the Court should have found that the case posed a political question); 
Michael W. McConnell, Two·and.a·HalfCheers for Bush v. Gore, 63 U.CHI. L. 
REv. 657, 660 (2001) {arguing that the Court's "Fourteenth Amendment holding 
.•. was both sensible and persuasive," but that "the decision to halt the recount 
was incorrect as a matter of law (though the question is closer than the Court's 
critics like to think.)"). 
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other hand, are similarly unanimous in believing that the Florida 
recount was eminently justified and that the Supreme Court's 
decision was an outrage.3 
Yet the actual issues in dispute, as opposed to the upshot of 
their resolution, had no obvious ideological valence.4 There is no 
priori reason why Republicans should in general oppose manual 
recounts, while Democrats should in general favor them. The 
3. For liberal academics taking this view, see Michael Klarman, Bush v. Gore 
Through the Lens o/Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1721, 1725 (2001) 
("[T]he Bush outcome was a product of . . . partisan political preference for 
George W. Bush, which ... may have been enhanced by [a] desire to retire from 
the court while a Republican President is in office .... ); Jed Rubenfeld, Not as 
Bad as Plessy. Worse, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2 (forthcoming) ("The 
breathtaking indefensibility of Bush v. Gore is of an order different from the deep 
ideological clashes surrounding cases like Plessy and Roe."); Owen Fiss, The 
Fallibility o/Reason, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2 (forthcoming) ("[The Court's] 
equal protection holding has no constitutional warrant."); Margaret Jane Radin, 
Can the Rule 0/ lAw Survive Bush v. Gore?, in LEGITIMACY, supra note 2 
(forthcoming) ("instead of deciding the case in accordance with pre-existing legal 
principles, fairly interpreted or even stretched if need be, five Republican 
members of the Court decided the case in a way that is recognizably nothing 
more than a naked expression of these justices' preference for the Republican 
Party"); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 737, 737 (2001) ("[S]everal members of the Court-perhaps a 
majority-weredetennined to overturn any ruling of the Florida Supreme Court 
that was favorable to Vice President Gore, at least if that ruling significantly 
enhanced the Vice President's chances of winning the election."); Jack M. Balkin, 
Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between lAw and Politics, 110 YALEL.J. 1407, 
1434 (2001) ("There simply was no lawless court for the U.S. Supreme Court to 
counteract, just a court that construed its own local law in a way that five 
Justices did not like."); Cass R. Sunstein, Order without lAw, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 
757,758 (2001) ("[T]he Court's rationale was not only exceedingly ambitious but 
also embarrassingly weak."). For a notable counterexample of a liberal who 
argued for a legal outcome that would not have favored Gore, see Neal Katyal, 
Florida's Election Day Vote Could Be Irrelevant, FindLaw's Legal Commentary, 
< http://writ.news.findlaw.comlcommentary/20001109 Jtatyal.html > (visited 
Nov. 5, 2001) (arguing that "the Constitution and Congress ... have given the 
Florida legislature the task of redressing problems in this hotly-contested 
election."). 
4. I argue below that the decision in fact has a political valence which is 
somewhat less than obvious. See infra pp. 1013-18. 
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difference between "hanging" and "pregnant" chads does not 
connect in any straightforward way with the great issues of our 
time that divide liberals from conservatives. Indeed, partisans on 
both sides were required to reverse some of their more accustomed 
positions-with regard to federalism concerns, judicial "activism," 
and the scope of equal protection review, for example-in order to 
reach the outcomes that coincided with political advantage.5 
Advocates of "neutral principles" often decry the willingness of 
judges to sacrifice legal for ideological virtue. The argument 
surrounding the 2000 election indicates that things may be much 
worse than these advocates suppose. The election debacle suggests 
an inability to maintain even ideological consistency. Moreover, 
this contagion of ideological malleability extended far beyond the 
realm of official advocates and spokespeople for both sides, where 
tendentious argument is widely assumed to be a distasteful but 
necessary professional obligation. It also claimed virtually all of the 
politicians and media commentators who debated the matter 
endlessly on television and Op Ed pages. Perhaps more 
surprisingly, many "talking heads" from the academy, who often 
present themselves as above partisan bickering, were infected. 
There are some who believe that the malady tainted the decisions 
of the Florida Supreme Court, whose Democratic majority handed 
Gore his greatest victories. And, as I shall argue in some detail 
below, the United States Supreme Court itself fell victim when its 
contentious five-four decision, precisely tracking the Court's 
liberal-conservative fault line, made George W. Bush the President 
of the United States. 
What are we to make of this much-ignored elephant-or should 
I say donkey?-in the parlor? Are we to think it no more than an 
astounding coincidence that through disinterested ratiocination, 
liberals came to one set of conclusions that happened to meet their 
5. See Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 
679,683 (2001) (arguing that "[t]aking one by one the issues oflaw that crucially 
divided the majority from the dissenters in Bush v. Gore, it seems that ideological 
alignment either doesn't predict the vote at all or that it predicts the opposite of 
the votes cast by conservatives"). 
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political needs, while conservatives came to another set of 
conclusions that happened to meet theirs? I, for one, am not quite 
cynical enough to think that all the participants in the debates and 
judicial decisions surrounding the election consciously misstated 
their true beliefs for the sake of political advantage. But neither am 
I ingenuous enough to take seriously the "mere coincidence" 
explanation. Eliminating these possibilities leaves us with the 
disturbing hypothesis that many of our beliefs-including those 
expressed in this essay-are the unconscious product of something 
other than the reasoned arguments offered on their behalf.6 If this 
hypothesis is correct, then our very lack of consciousness about the 
process, as well as our ability to mask our predispositions with 
reasoned argument, raises disturbing questions about theories of 
deliberative democracy/ 
In this essay, I respond to these worries with the 
counterintuitive suggestion that unconsciously tendentious 
constitutional argument has the potential to facilitate deliberation. 
In order to make sense of this claim, we need to understand 
something about the fantasy world inhabited by many academic 
constitutional theorists and about what happened to that world on 
the evening of December 12, 2000. 
6. See Michael C. Dorf & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain 
Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 947 (2001): 
Id. 
Undoubtedly, no academic saw him or herself as claiming the academic 
bully pulpit or trading on academic credentials for purely partisan aims. 
But as psychological studies going back several decades have shown, 
partisans of different camps will integrate identical information in 
clearly divergent ways. All too often identical information is analyzed 
in distinctly self-interested ways by parties claiming in good faith to be 
examining the situation objectively. Anyone too busy to read this 
literature need only think about the racially polarized views of the O.J. 
Simpson case or, for that matter, about how throughout the Florida 
controversy, in viewing identical events, Republicans and Democrats 
were each convinced that partisans of the other party were trying to 
steal the election. 
7. For a useful discussion, see Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: 
Transmutation andMisrepresentation, 3 LEGAL THEORY 133 (1997). 
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Perhaps it reveals an unfortunate parochialism to focus on the 
difficulties of legal academics who specialize in constitutional law. 
Still, their confusion is of some importance because they articulate 
the "Official Story" of .constitutionalism. Even if, as I shall argue 
below, that story bears little relationship to reality, it is nonetheless 
of some moment when the story begins to fall apart. 
According to the Official Story, constitutional law settles 
otherwise destabilizing political disputes through reference to a 
meta-agreement. People disagree about ordinary things, but they 
agree (or at least ought to agree) about the big things. This 
agreement, whether embodied in the constitutional text, or in 
doctrine and tradition that has glossed it, prevents the community 
from coming unraveled. Sometimes the agreement is substantive, as 
for example, when the Constitution directly prohibits certain 
outcomes like laws depriving people of property without just 
compensation. More often it is procedural, as when the 
Constitution allocates decision making authority to a branch of the 
federal government, the states, or the private sphere. Whatever its 
source, we are supposedly able to reach political settlements by 
reasoning back down from the meta-agreement so as to settle 
contested political issues. 
For this story to make sense, four preconditions must be 
satisfied. First, there must be agreement on the metalevel. Second, 
there must be a discourse capable of mediating between the 
contested political level and the uncontroversial metalevel. Third, 
there must be an institution capable of engaging in the discourse. 
And finally, the institution and the discourse it utilizes must be 
"neutral" in the sense that they must not themselves be caught up 
in the very political controversy that they are supposed to settle. 
Conventionally, it is thought that the Constitution provides the 
area of agreement, that an arcane and specialized form of 
reasoning-legal reasoning-provides the mediating discourse, that 
the Supreme Court is uniquely capable of engaging in this 
discourse, and that both the Court and the discourse are free from 
political entanglements. Hence, the widely held view, apparently 
shared by at least some of the Justices, that only the Supreme Court 
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could settle our unsettled election. Hence, the belief that the 
Court's legitimacy rests upon its use of legal reasoning that is 
neutral and apolitical. And hence the crisis of conscience when the 
Court rendered a decision that struck many as unreasoned and 
blatantly political.8 
Not surprisingly, people whose professional lives are invested 
in the truth of the Official Story have reacted defensively to this 
assault upon it. The defensive maneuvers fall into three broad 
categories. First, a few brave souls (almost invariably conservatives 
and Bush supporters) have undertaken the unenviable task of 
attempting to demonstrate the legal respectability of the decision.9 
Second, others (mostly moderate Gore supporters) have been 
skeptical or agnostic about the decision itself, but have nonetheless 
taken its reasoning seriously. These commentators have suggested 
interesting avenues of future doctrinal development that the 
decision supposedly opens.10 Third, the vast majority of academics 
(almost invariably liberals and Gore supporters) have reacted with 
fury at the decision.ll They claim. that it is grossly political and that 
it therefore foolishly and needlessly squanders the Court's 
credibility which, as noted above, rests on its apolitical neutrality. 12 
Each of these views is profoundly mistaken. Part One of this 
8. See Balkin, supra note 3, at 1407 ("It is no secret that the Supreme Court's 
decision ... has shaken the faith of many legal academics in the Supreme Court 
and in the system of judicial review."). Id. at 1408-09 n.3 (citing sources). 
9. See sources supra note 2. 
10. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Court's Legacy for Voting Rights, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at A39 (arguing that the greater import of this case may be 
a surprising expansion of voting rights); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 758 (arguing 
that "[o]n its face, [the Court's] holding has the potential to create the most 
expansive, and perhaps sensible, protection for voting rights since the Court's 
one-person, one-vote decisions of mid-century"). 
11. Shortly after the decision, 673 law professors from 137 law schools 
signed a statement accusing the Court of "suppress[ing] the facts and performing 
the job of propagandists, not judges." N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,2001, at A7. For an 
account of how the statement came about, see Radin, supra note 3 ("The 
statement was circulated rather haphazardly through email by an accidental 
activist (me) pushed over the edge by a sense of outrage."). 
12. See supra note 3. 
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essay explains why. The Court's decision does not pass the "straight 
face" test when judged according to the aspirations for legal analysis 
required to make the Official Story plausible. There is no reason to 
take the decision seriously, and it portends precisely nothing with 
regard to future doctrinal developments. But it is also wrong to 
condemn the decision because it is political. There simply was no 
neutral, apolitical way in which the case could have been decided, 
as the dissenting justices themselves unwittingly demonstrate. 
Nor is there any evidence to suggest that the Court has 
squandered its credibility or that the community is about to come 
unstuck because the Court's partisanship has been unmasked. In his 
dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens lamented the fact that the 
decision "lend[ s] credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work 
of judges throughout the land."n Similarly, Justice Breyer darkly 
warned of a "self-inflicted wound" that might "harm not just the 
Court, but the Nation. ,,14 Yet despite these dire predictions, life 
seems to have gone on pretty much as before. In the wake of the 
Court's decision, there were no tanks in the streets, no raging mobs 
at the barricades. Public opinion polls suggested that, even though 
many people (correctly) understood that Bush v. Gore was 
political,15 the Court paid no price for the decision and may have 
even benefitted from it.16 
13. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
14.Id. at 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
15. For example, a Gallup poll in the immediate wake of the election found 
that 51% of those polled agreed with the statement that the U.S. Supreme Court 
justices were influenced by their personal political views when deciding the case. 
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Public Willing to Accept Supreme Court as FinalArbiter 0/ 
Election Dispute, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 12, 2000, at 
< http://www.gallup.comipolllreleases/pr001212.asp > (visited Nov. 5, 2001). 
A Newsweek poll conducted by Princeton Research Associates found that 65% 
of those surveyed thought that politics or partisanship played a major role er 
somewhat of a role in the Court's decision. See 
< http://www.pollingreport.comlwh2post.htm > (visited Nov. 5, 2001). 
16. A variety of polls found that the Court's standing with the American 
public changed little after its decision. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Laying Down the 
Law, Justices Ruled with Confidence, WASH. POST, July 1, 2001, at A6 (finding 
that [p ]ublic approval of the Supreme Court, as measured by polls, was not 
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All of which suggests that what's gone bad is not the Supreme 
Court, but instead the Official Story. How is it that the Supreme 
Court was able to play this role once stripped of the protective 
covering of legality that mainstream academics have insisted is 
essential to its legitimacy? 
Three possibilities suggest themselves. First, the Court may 
have prevailed through deception. Perhaps the decision is parasitic 
on the reputation for legality or integrity that the Court has built 
up over the years or on the pseudo-religious imagery that it uses to 
obscure its exercise of power. I do not discount this possibility. The 
Court's decision had the external trappings of legality, even though 
it lacked the requisite substance. If people were fooled by these 
trappings, and if the Court emerges from Bush v. Gore confident in 
its ability to fool, then the decision will have been an unmitigated 
disaster. 
But it is far too soon to assume that the Court has in fact been 
successful. Polling data suggests that it did not escape the attention . 
of the American people that the five most conservative justices 
dented by the election case and that 72% of those polled expressed a favorable 
view of the Court); Jeffrey M. Jones, Opinion o/U.S. Supreme Court Has Become 
More Politicized, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 3, 2001, at 
<http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/prOl0103b.asp > (visited Nov. 5, 2001) 
(fmding that after election 49% of Americans had "either a great deal or quite a 
lot" of confidence in the U.S. Supreme Court, compared with 47% in a poll 
taken before the election). Most Americans seem to have been grateful to the 
Court for ending the controversy. See, e.g., David W. Moore, Eight in Ten 
Americans to AcceptBush as "Legitimate" President, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 
14, 2000, at <http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214.asp> (visited 
Nov. 5,2001) (fmding that 52% of those surveyed agreed with the Court's 
decision to stop the recount). On the other hand, there is some evidence that the 
overall statistics mask an increased political polarization about the Court. See, 
e.g., Herbert M. Kritzer, Into the Election Waters: The Impact ofBush v. Gore on 
Public Perceptions andKnowledgeo/the Supreme Court, 85 JUDICATURE 32 (2001) 
(fmding that the overall approval of the Court may have been unchanged because 
of cross-cutting shifts, with those approving of the Court's decision increasing 
their support and those disapproving the decision decreasing their support; 
Jones, supra (finding that "surface stability [concerning American's opinions 
about the Supreme Court] masked significant change in the way Republicans and 
Democrats view [the Court]"). 
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favored the outcome, while their four more liberal colleagues 
opposed it.17 H there was any deception at all, it was likely a kind 
of self-deception-a willful overlooking of facts that were there for 
all to see. 
A second possibility is that the Supreme Court provided a 
useful focal point even though its decision was correctly perceived 
to be partisan rather than legal. Although the country was sharply 
divided about the election's outcome, there was near unanimity in 
the desire to get the matter over with.18 Even if the Supreme Court 
was acting nonlegally, it was at least able to settle the issue in a 
peaceful and orderly fashion. 
The trouble with this account is that it fails to explain why 
people were prepared to endorse settlement by the Supreme Court, 
rather than another institution. After all, the federal judiciary was 
not the only possible focal point. The 2000 election might have 
been settled by the Florida Supreme Court, by the Florida 
Legislature, or, most plausibly, by the United States Congress.19 Yet 
17. See supra note 15. 
18. Within a week of the Court's decision, eight in ten Americans were 
saying that they accepted Bush as the legitimate President. See Moore, supra note 
16, at <httpllwww.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr001214.asp>. The same poll 
showed that although 42% of Americans agreed with the Supreme Court's 
decision, 66% said that the decision had no effect on their view of the court. Id 
19. Some commentators have asserted that if the Court had not intervened, 
the controversy would have spun out of control. See Richard A. Posner, Florida 
2000: A Legal and Statistical Analysis of the Election Deadlock and the Ensuing 
Litigation, 2000 SUP. CT. REv. 1,45-46 (2000). Cj Sunstein, supra note 3, at 769 
(speculating that a genuine constitutional crisis might have arisen and that 
although "the nation would have survived, •.. things would have gotten very 
messy"}.Id. Of course, there is no way to be certain what would have happened, 
but I believe these claims are hyperbolic. The disputed election of 1800 was 
resolved without judicial intervention even though the country, at that point, 
had no precedent for a peaceful transfer of power from one party to another and 
the outgoing administration had incarcerated many of its political opponents. 
Similarly, the election of 1876 was settled peaceably although the country was 
still sharply divided by the Civil War, which had ended only eleven years earlier. 
No doubt, a congressional struggle over the presidency in these calmer times 
would nonetheless have been bitter and divisive, but I have little doubt that it 
eventually would have been resolved without resort to force. 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 963 2001-2002
2001] OUR UNSETTLEDELECTION 963 
for reasons that the Official Story leaves entirely mysterious, the 
country seemed quite satisfied-indeed, grateful-that nine 
unelected, politically motivated justices in Washington D.C. settled 
the matter. 
In Part Two of this essay, I explore a third possibility-one that 
turns the Official Story inside out. There is a chance that Bush v. 
Gore may begin a process of laying a more attractive and realistic 
foundation for constitutionalism than the Official Story provides. 
The very fact that the CoUrt is not politically independent and that 
it could not settle the matter in a disinterested, apolitical fashion 
might set us down a path toward a more mature version of 
constitutional law. The politically tendentious character of the 
Coon's reasoning demonstrates that our core constitutional 
commitments are subject to political manipulation. Ironically, 
public understanding of this malleability makes our politics more, 
rather than less, inclusive. It does so by suggesting that 
constitutional law , properly understood, does not settle disputes by 
ruling cenain substantive positions out-of-bounds. Thus, losers in 
our political disputes need not believe that they are outside the 
boundaries of respectable argument, defined by an exclusionary 
constitution. Instead, they may come to understand that they too 
can utilize the magnificently empty rhetoric of constitutional law 
to achieve their ends. The upshot is continuing and unresolved 
struggle over the meaning of American democracy. It is this 
possibility of struggle, rather than a legally definitive resolution, 
that encourages people with incompatible political views to remain 
in an ongoing and peaceful dialogue with each other.20 
20. For a more general defense of the theoretical position I articulate here, 
see LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETILED CONSmunON: A NEW 
ARGUMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAlJSMAND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001). This essay 
is intended as a case study, applying the position I defend in my book-length 
treatment to a particularly interesting set of facts. 
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II. THE DECISION 
A. Prologue: How the Supreme Court Ran Out the Clock 
Any serious discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Bush 
v. Gore must begin by facing a difficult dilemma. Even the most 
vigorous attack on the Court's reasoning serves in some measure to 
normalize the decision. Such an attack implicitly assumes that the 
Coun advanced its reasons in good faith and that its reasoning 
merits a good faith response. But there is little reason for affording 
the Coun the benefit of this presumption. Any effon to engage 
with the opinion therefore takes it more seriously than it deserves 
to be taken. The best evidence for the Court's lack of seriousness 
derives from its apparently intentional effort to create the very 
problems that it chastised the state court for failing to resolve. To 
see how the justices laid a trap for the hapless and unwitting Florida 
coun, we must examine the procedural and temporal context for its 
holding. 
The majority handed George W. Bush the presidency by relying 
upon the interaction of two legal arguments. First, the Court held 
that a state wide, manual recount administered under a broad 
standard requiring discernment of the "intent of the voter" would 
lead to "arbitrary and disparate" treatment in violation of the equal 
protection c1ause.21 Standing alone, this holding might have 
required no more than a remand to the Florida Supreme Coun for 
it to fashion uniform sub standards to guide decisionmaking. The 
Coun's second holding prevented this outcome. In two short 
paragraphs at the conclusion of its opinion, the Coun found that 
the Florida Supreme Coun had said that the Florida legislature 
intended the state's election laws to mandate compliance with the 
"safe harbor" provision contained in 3 U.S.C. § 5.22 This pro-
vision,23 in tum, had the effect of establishing a December 12 
21. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,105 (2000). 
22. See id. at 110-11. 
23. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994) which provides as follows: 
If any State shall have provided ... for its final determination of any 
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deadline for the recount's completion.24 By the time the Court 
rendered its decision, this deadline was only hours away. Because 
"any recount seeking to meet [this deadline would] be 
unconstitutional,,,25 the Court reversed the judgment ordering the 
recount to proceed. 
Assuming a December 12 deadline existed and that a more 
specific, uniform standard was constitutionally mandated, then the 
Court correctly held that a recount was impossible by the time it 
rendered its decision. I challenge these assumptions below. 
However, even if they are accepted, we need to reckon with the 
Court's own responsibility for this unfortunate state of affairs. The 
Florida Court might have fashioned a uniform standard for a 
manual recount when ample time still remained to complete the 
tabulation. However, the state court failed to do so for three 
reasons, each of which can be laid at the doorstep of the United 
States Supreme Court.26 
First, it is important to understand that the Court's initial 
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the 
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures, and 
such determination shall have been made at least six days before the 
time fIxed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made 
pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made six days prior to 
said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern 
in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, 
and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors 
appointed by such State is concerned. 
24. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110. December 18 had been established as the date 
for counting the electoral votes; December 12 had been established for taking 
advantage of this provision. 
25.1d. 
26. It must be noted that a fourth reason is attributable to the Florida 
Supreme Court. Had the Florida Supreme Court not extended the protest phase 
in its fIrst decision, (see Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 
1226 (pIa. 2000», there would have been more time to complete the contest 
phase. In light of the Florida Supreme Court's subsequent decision mandating 
de novo review of the "protest" result, (see Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (pIa. 
2000», its decision extending this phase, in the teeth of clear statutory language 
establishing a deadline for completion, is difficult to defend. But see infra note 
115. 
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encounter with the equal protection argument came eight days 
before its ultimate decision. At an earlier stage in the process, the 
Florida Supreme Court had extended the deadline for completion 
of the "protest" phase of the recount,27 and canvassing boards were 
busily recounting ballots pursuant to this order. George W. Bush 
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme 
Court challenging this decision.28 In his petition, Bush raised three 
issues for review. The first two concerned the legality of the state 
court's extension of the statutory deadline for completing the 
"protest" phase.29 Bush argued that this decision constituted a 
judicial rewriting of Florida's statutory scheme, thereby violating 
the Article II requirement that the method for choosing electors be 
determined by the state legislature.3o Moreover, Bush contended 
that the Florida Court's interpretation of its election laws violated 
3 U.S.C. § 5, which provided a "safe harbor" for states whose 
electors were challenged only if the procedures for challenge were 
in place before election day.31 
Although both of these questions hold some abstract interest, 
neither one had much importance by the time the Court decided 
the case. The court-imposed deadline for the protest was fast 
approaching and, whether or not the extension was lawful, it was 
clear that the ultimate resolution of the election would come in the 
"contest" phase. Nonetheless, to the surprise of many, the Court 
addressed these questions.32 
In contrast, the third question raised by the Bush petition 
pertained to the upcoming" contest" phase as well as the soon-to-be 
completed "protest" phase. Bush asked the Court to decide 
27. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1235 
(PIa. 2000). 
28. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 
petitionforcert.filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Nov. 24,2000) (No.00-836). The 
petition can be found in the U.S. Supreme Court's Records & Briefs, Bush v. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., Petitionfor Writ o/Certiorari (No. 00-836). 
29. See U.S. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, supra note 28, at i. 
30. See id. 
31. See id. 
32. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
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"Whether the use of arbitrary, standardless, and selective manual 
recounts that threaten to overturn the results of the election for 
President of the United States violates the Equal Protection or Due 
Process Clauses or the First Amendment. "33 In this part of the 
petition, Bush outlined many of the same complaints about the 
absence of a uniform standard that the Court ultimately found 
meritorious eight days later.34 But at the point when something 
might actually have been done about the problem, the Court was 
uninterested in the argument. Although the Court granted 
certiorari to hear the two questions that barely mattered, it 
conspicuously refused to grant certiorari to hear the third 
question.35 
In light of the determinate weight the Court ultimately gave to 
this argument, its failure to grant review at this earlier stage is 
troubling. To be sure, the intersection between facts and law was 
not identical in the two cases. The equal protection problems posed 
by a state wide recount were somewhat different from those posed 
by recounts in selective counties. The fact remains, that, at the very 
least, the underlying argument that the Court finally accepted 
would also have brought into question the procedures Bush 
challenged in his initial petition. If the Court had granted that 
petition and dealt with these problems at an earlier stage, the 
Florida Supreme Court could easily have imposed a uniform 
standard and would have had ample time to complete the recount 
during the contest phase.36 
33. U.S. Supreme Court Records & Briefs, supra note 28, at i. 
34. See id. at 21-23. 
35. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 70, 104 (2000). 
36. I do not mean to suggest that the Court deliberately delayed 
consideration of this question so as to prevent the state supreme court from 
correcting the problem before the putative December 12 deadline. Still, it is 
troubling that the Court eventually found dispositive an argument that, a week 
earlier, it had not even considered worthy of review. The most cynical view of 
this chronology is that the Court latched onto an argument which the justices 
themselves thought unworthy of serious consideration, in a desperate attempt 
to find some ground on which to reverse the Florida court. A less cynical version 
would attribute incompetence, rather than malevolence, to the justices. Even on 
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Of course, even in the absence of a United States Supreme 
Court holding, the Florida Supreme Court might have adopted a 
uniform standard on its own. However, its failure to do so is also 
directly attributable to the United States Supreme Court's earlier 
actions. As already noted. in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board,37 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
decide whether the Florida court had improperly modified the 
statutory electoral scheme. Although it failed to resolve this 
question definitively, the Court vacated the state court's judgment 
and remanded the case with directions to the Florida court to 
clarify the basis for its decision.38 
This action strongly implied that if the state court had changed 
the statutory scheme, the change would be unlawful. Not 
surprisingly, then, the Florida court went to great lengths to show 
that it had taken the h:int. In its opinion after the remand, it sought 
to demonstrate that its original decision constituted no more than 
an interpretation of an ambiguous statute.39 More to the point, 
when the question arose as to the appropriate standard for 
evaluating ballots during the contest phase, the Florida court was 
careful to confine itself to the statutory language, which invoked 
the general "intent of the voter" standard.40 Given what had come 
before, the Florida court had good reason to fear that if it attempted 
to articulate a more specific standard, the United States Supreme 
Court would have found a violation of Article II. Having bent over 
backward to avoid this problem, the state court found itself 
chastised instead for its failure to embroider on the statutory 
language so as to make it more specific. 
Of course, it is theoretically possible that the constitutional 
the less cynical view, however, the fact remains that had the Court thought more 
clearly at the beginning of the process about which issues mattered and which 
did not, the time problem that ultimately doomed the recount might never have 
ansen. 
37.531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
38. See id. at 78. 
39. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273,1282-
89 (Fla. 2000). 
40. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257, 1262 (Fla. 2000). 
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problem that ultimately defeated the recount effort was created by 
the Florida legislature, rather than the Florida court. One might 
argue that the legislature violated the Equal Protection Clause when 
it failed to articulate a more specific standard, and that Article IT left 
the Florida court powerless to correct this defect. On this view, the 
recount was doomed regardless of the state court's actions. The 
trouble with this approach, though, is that it cannot be reconciled 
with the United States Supreme Court's opinion. The Court did 
not hold that the any recount conducted pursuant to the Florida 
statutory scheme was necessarily illegal.41 Instead, it held that there 
was insufficient time for the state court to formulate and implement 
a more specific standard.42 Yet time ran out only because the very 
justices who criticized the state court had discouraged it from 
formulating such a standard when there was still time to implement 
it. 
There is still a third respect in which the Court's earlier actions 
created the very problem that it found impossible to remedy. Time 
ran out on the Florida recount in no small measure because the 
United States Supreme Court itself decided to run out the clock. 
With the state wide recount already underway and significant 
progress being made, the Court, over a strong dissent by the four 
justices who ultimately dissented from its judgment on the merits, 
entered a stay that brought the recount to an abrupt halt.43 No 
further progress was made during the agonizing three days it took 
the Court to hear argument and decide the case. 
Had the recount been allowed to proceed while the matter was 
under review, the difficulties that the Court ultimately discerned 
might never have materialized. The circuit judge, charged by the 
Florida Supreme Court with overseeing the recount, might have 
resolved disputes under a uniform standard.44 Even if he failed to do 
so, the canvassing boards conducting the recount might have 
41. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 110. 
42. Seeid. 
43. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). 
44. The Florida court's remand order gave the circuit court sweeping powers 
to administer the statewide recount. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1262. 
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determined the number of ballots falling into various categories. 
Had the United States Supreme Court at that point decided that a 
uniform standard was constitutionally compelled, the state court 
could simply have imposed the standard on the already counted 
ballots. 
The Supreme Court offered no reason for the entry of its stay, 
and it is hard to imagine what threatened, irreparable injury could 
have justified its action. In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia 
offered two suggestions: The counting of votes, he claimed, 
threatened irreparable injury "by casting a cloud upon what [Bush] 
claims to be the legitimacy of his election, "45 and by "prevent[ing] 
an accurate recount from being conducted on a proper basis later, 
since it is generally agreed that each manual recount produces a 
degradation of the ballots, which renders a subsequent recount 
inaccurate. "46 
If the full Court acted for the reasons Justice Scalia specified, 
then its decision was plainly wrong. The" cloud" theory ignores the 
obvious point that for irreparable injury to justify a stay, the injury 
must stem from the legal wrongdoing alleged by the petitioner. But 
at no stage in the litigation did anyone suggest a theory under 
which the mere tabulation of ballots (as opposed to the celtification 
of outcomes) violated the law. Thus, even if counting the ballots 
threw doubt on the legitimacy of the election, and even if it were 
appropriate for the Court to protect against public perceptions 
brought about by illegal conduct, the Court plainly had no business 
enjoining entirely legal conduct that might bring the election's 
outcome into disrepute. To claim otherwise would be to suggest 
that the Court should have intervened to stop Florida's cooperation 
with the post-election efforts by various news organizations to 
tabulate the ballots so that the public could judge for itself the 
election's legitimacy.47 
45. Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046. 
46.Id. 
47. Such a holding is implausible even if we put to one side the First 
Amendment right of newspapers to conduct such a recount. Does anyone 
suppose that, but for the First Amendment, the Constitution could be read to 
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To be sure, there might have been a basis for Supreme Court 
intervention if the putatively illegal recount endangered a 
subsequent, legally required recount by" degrading" the ballots. But 
there was never much chance of a subsequent recount. By 
December 9, when it issued the stay, the Court must have known 
that there would be no such recount prior to the supposed 
December 12 deadline. Even if there were no deadline, a new 
recount would not have been necessary so long as the circuit judge 
had the opportunity to impose a uniform standard on the ballots 
that had been categorized by the canvassing boards. And even if 
there were a new recount, the extent to which ballot degradation 
would have threatened its integrity is, at best, debatable.48 Against 
these speculative risks was the much more likely possibility (it 
turned out to be a certainty) that the recount would be altogether 
frustrated not by ballot degradation, but by the Court's own stay. 
It is surely more than mere hindsight bias to recognize that this 
second risk greatly outweighed the first. Indeed, Justice Stevens 
contemporaneously predicted precisely this outcome in his dissent 
from the granting of the stay.49 
B. The Supreme Court's Frantic Search for a Constitutional Problem 
As the preceding discussion demonstrates, the Supreme Court's 
own prior conduct manufactured whatever constitutional problem 
it set about to resolve in its December 12 opinion. This fact, in 
tum, creates the suspicion that the Court was engaged in an 
elaborate game of "gotcha" with the Florida judiciary and 
reenforces the belief that its ultimate rationale for ending the 
recount should not be taken seriously. Still, backgroUnd rules of 
civility in public debate require that we at least begin by presuming 
the good faith of those with whom we disagree. In the next Part, I 
will suggest that this requirement, applied to these facts, produces 
prohibit newspapers from counting the ballots in Florida? 
48. See, e.g .• CanvassingBoardSegregates 'Under Votes, 'MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 
20, 2000 (debating whether recounting degrades ballots). 
49. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 1046. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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a positive payoff. There is a way to understand the Court's conduct 
as motivated by defensible concerns honestly held. First, however, 
it is important to establish that the opinions the Justices in the 
majority produced do nothing to advance that understanding. What 
these opinions instead demonstrate is that despite the Court's own 
best efforts to create a constitutional problem, when it finally 
turned to the task of solving the problem, it found nothing that 
plausibly required its intervention. 
1. The Mythical Equal Protection Problem 
The Court's per curiam opinion holds that the recount 
procedure ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it did "not satisfy the minimum 
requirement for non-arbitrary treatment of voters necessary to 
secure the fundamental right [to vote].,,50 To be sure, the Florida 
Supreme Court had mandated an "intent of the voter" test to judge 
the validity of ballots.51 But while this test was "unobjectionable as 
an abstract proposition and a starting principle," it was 
constitutionally inadequate without "specific standards to ensure its 
equal application. ,,52 The Court identified several examples of 
potential arbitrariness that might arise without a more specific rule. 
The test for accepting and rejecting contested ballots "might vary 
not only from county to county but indeed within a single county 
from one recount team to another. ,,53 Moreover, in some counties, 
only undervotes were recounted, while in others, the recount 
extended to all ballots.54 And in counties where only undervotes 
were recounted, the system discriminated against individuals who 
had "mark[ed] two candidates in a way discernable by the machine 
. . . even if a manual examination of the ballot would reveal the 
50. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,106 (2000). 
51. See Gore, 772 So. 2d at 1243. 
52. Bush, 531 U.S. at 106. 
53.Id 
54. See id. at 107. 
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requisite indicia of intent. ,,55 
As I have already argued, many of these anomalies might have 
been resolved if the Supreme Court had only allowed the recount 
procedure to run its course and the circuit judge to make ultimate 
findings that might have regularized the process. Suppose we 
assume arguendo that no such regularization would have occurred. 
Does the kind of disparate treatment of ballots that the Court 
describes violate the Equal Protection Clause? 
A striking feature of the Court's opinion is its failure to utilize 
any of the normal machinery of equal protection analysis. There is 
no discussion of the relevant classes, no articulation of the 
appropriate level of review, no effort to determine whether a 
"purpose" or "effects" test is appropriate, no weighing of the 
countervailing state interest supporting the classification. One must 
sympathize with the justices, who had to produce their opinions 
under extraordinary time pressure. Moreover, even when opinions 
can be written at a more leisurely pace, there are circumstances 
where analytical casualness can be a virtue. In cases where the 
Court wishes to appeal to widely recognized moral truths, 
hypertechnicallegal analysis can sometimes be more distracting 
than illuminating.56 But on this occasion, something like the 
opposite problem arises. Although time pressure no doubt made it 
exceedingly difficult for the Court to come to grips with complex 
analytical problems, the fact remains that its failure to think 
55. Id at 108. 
56. Although reasonable people can certainly disagree, I believe that Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), was such a case. In Romer, the Court appealed to 
"transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society," 
and "our constitutional tradition" to invalidate a provision of the Colorado 
constitution that prohibited the state or any of its subdivisions from protecting 
homosexuals against claims of discrimination. Id. at 631, 633. For my somewhat 
ambivalent defense of the decision, see Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's 
Radicalism: The Unexpected Revival of Warren Court Activism, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REv. 67 (1996). That defense was explicitly premised upon a contestable view 
about the moral status of homosexuality. The defensibility of the analytic 
casualness of the Bush v. Gore majority is similarly dependent upon contestable 
political and moral judgments. See infra pp. 1013-18. 
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carefully about doctrinal structure led it to miss the underlying 
moral questions it needed to examine. 
Consider first the failure to identify the disadvantaged class. 
Defining such a class turns out to be quite difficult. Perhaps the 
class consists of voters whose votes were not counted but would 
have been had canvassing boards utilized a relatively more forgiving 
standard. For simplicity, I will call voters whose intent was 
controversial "dimplers." It might be supposed that dimplers in 
precincts using the stringent standard were treated unequally when 
compared to dimplers in precincts utilizing a forgiving standard. 
Whereas dimplers from forgiving precincts were lumped together 
with nondimplers, dimplers in stringent precincts were not. 
But this definition of the relevant classes turns out to be too 
imprecise. The dimplers located in the two kinds of precincts can 
be subdivided into two other, crosscutting classes: Some dimplers 
meant to cast ballots for President, while others did not. I will call 
these two groups, "voters" and "abstainers," respectively. True, 
dimplers from stringent precincts were disadvantaged if they were 
also voters, but they were not disadvantaged if they were abstainers. 
Conversely, dimplers from forgiving precincts were disadvantaged 
if they were abstainers,s7 but they were not disadvantaged if they 
were voters. 
Suppose we focus on voting dimplers living in stringent 
precincts. A uniformly applied forgiving standard would indeed 
remedy their disadvantage. But such a standard would discriminate 
against all abstaining dimplers, when compared to the class of 
abstaining nondimplers, who indicated a desire in some other way, 
for example, by leaving their ballots blank. Conversely, a 
uniformly applied stringent standard vindicates the right of 
abstaining dimplers living in forgiving precincts, but only by 
creating state wide disadvantage for voting dimplers as compared to 
voting nondimplers. 
It turns out then, that any uniform standard creates a class of 
57. I am assuming here that individuals are disadvantaged when their votes 
are counted for a candidate they did not intend to vote for. 
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people disadvantaged vis a vis another class. There is no apparent 
reason to suppose that a uniform standard creates more equality 
than a nonuniform standard. For example, if we assume that most 
dimplers are also voters, then a nonuniform standard counting the 
vote of some dimplers may create more equality than a uniform 
unforgiving standard failing to count the votes of any dimplers. 
Conversely, if most dimplers are abstainers, then nonuniformity 
may create more equality than uniform leniency. 
Ordinary equal protection doctrine has resources for dealing 
with problems of this sort-techniques that the Court might have 
taken advantage of, if only it had paid some attention to the 
standard doctrine. There are two possible solutions. Sometimes, the 
Court avoids the difficulty by insisting upon more finely tuned, less 
rule-like standards.58 For example, suppose a state is trying to 
determine whether teachers who are more than four months 
pregnant are physically fit to teach.59 This problem has the same 
structure as the dimpler dilemma. A uniform rule banning all such 
teachers will discriminate against those who are fit by lumping 
them together with the nonfit. In contrast, a uniform rule 
permitting all pregnant teachers to continue teaching will allow 
some women, who are physically unfit because of their pregnancy, 
to continue. This solution therefore discriminates against teachers 
forced to leave their jobs because of other, nonpregnancy-related 
disabilities. 
One way out of the dilemma is to abandon a uniform rule and 
to look instead at individual teachers to determine, on the facts of 
their particular cases, whether they are fit to teach.6O Similarly, the 
58. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (requiring 
individualized judgment about whether unwed father had sufficient connection 
to child to object to adoption); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (requiring 
individualized determination of whether student transferring to state .university 
from out of state was a resident of the state). 
59. Cf. Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) 
(invalidating school board rule that every pregnant school teacher must take 
maternity leave without pay beginning five months before the expected birth of 
her child). 
60. See id. at 644 (invaliding rule requiring maternity leave after fourth 
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Court might have solved the dimpler problem by insisting that 
canvassing boards make individualized determinations of whether 
dimplers intended to vote. 
Of course, Bush v. Gore not only fails to pursue this solution; 
the very constitutional defect it identifies is that the Florida Court 
chose to pursue it. Perhaps the Court was correct to think that the 
solution was less attractive when dealing with pregnant chads than 
when dealing with pregnant teachers. The Court had some reason 
to fear that if left to their own devices, individual canvassing 
boards, faced with thousands of ballots to examine, would not 
make individualized judgments about each ballot, but would instead 
simply apply inconsistent but nonetheless rigid rules. The Court 
might also have feared that politically motivated canvassing boards 
might distort the rules to help the candidate they favored. 
If these were the Court's concerns, then it was left with the 
second solution to problems of this sort. This solution involves 
determining whether a "purpose" or "effects" test should be 
utilized. When the Court uses a purpose test, then facial uniformity 
alone usually satisfies equal protection requirements. Even though 
the statutory classification has the effect of treating some group 
badly, the classification is usually upheld under "rational basis" 
review unless the legislature has the purpose of disadvantaging a 
suspect class.61 For example, if the Court were to use a "purpose" 
test in evaluating the pregnant teacher rule, it might hold that the 
rule is unconstitutional if, but only if, it was enacted "because of" 
rather than "in spite of" its impact on pregnant women.62 
month of pregnancy because "[t]here is no individualized determination by the 
teacher's doctor-or the school board's [doctor]-as to any particular teacher's 
ability to continue at her job"}. 
61. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
62. Cj Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) 
(holding that heightened scrutiny appropriate only when a state "selected or 
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group"). For the Court's 
application of a similar test in the pregnancy context, see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 
U.S. 484 (1974). The case was effectively overruled by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 977 2001-2002
2001] OUR UNSETILEDELECTION 977 
In contrast, when the Court uses an effects test, a uniform 
standard is subject to heightened review and often invalidated 
simply because of its adverse impact even in the absence of proof 
that the standard was meant to disadvantage a suspect class. Thus, 
under an effects test, the pregnancy rule might be invalid because of 
its impact on women even if the impact was not the purpose of the 
rule.63 
The Court's prior decisions are not completely clear as to which 
test is appropriate in the voting context. For example, the Court's 
reapportionment decisions adopt an effects test. The Court did not 
require a showing that legislatures had the purpose of 
disadvantaging citizens living in underrepresented districts or that 
the failure to redistrict was directed against a discrete and insular 
minority. Because voting was deemed a "fundamental right," the 
Court strictly scrutinized malapportioned districts simply because 
they had the effect of making some votes worth less than others.64 
Similarly, in cases of absolute deprivation of the right to vote, the 
Court has not usually required a showing of illicit purpose.65 Denial 
of this fundamental right is subject to heightened review even when 
there is no purpose to discriminate against an identifiable group. 
In contrast, the Court has insisted on a showing of illicit 
purpose in gerrymandering, vote dilution, and racial districting 
cases.66 For example, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,67 the Court 
63. The Court has interpreted some statutory protections of civil rights as 
embodying an effects test. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971) (holding that employment practices having a disproportionate racial effect 
are illegal in absence of a "business necessity"). 
64. See, e.g., Avery v. Midland City, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
65. See, e.g., Phoenixv. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Kramer v. Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969). 
66. Michael McConnell therefore oversimplifies current doctrine when he 
asserts that "in cases involving fundamental rights, such as the right to vote, the 
Court applies strict scrutiny to all disparities, without regard to whether the 
disparities reflect discrimination against any protected group. " McConnell, supra 
note 2, at 673. 
67. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
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considered the constitutionality of redrawing the boundary lines 
for Tuskeegee, Alabama in a fashion that excluded virtually all 
African-Americans from the jurisdiction.68 Although the opinion 
is somewhat ambiguous,69 subsequent cases have declared this action 
unconstitutional only because the redrawing purposely deprived 
African-Americans of the franchise.70 Similarly, the COU!'t has on 
occasion rejected vote-dilution claims despite a showing that an 
electoral system had the effect of reducing the value of African-
American votes?1 The Court has insisted that this showing be 
supplemented by a further demonstration that those who created 
the scheme intended to produce the effect.72 Although it has 
acknowledged that the requisite purpose will almost always be 
present, the Court has nonetheless insisted that the desire to reduce 
the voting power of a political group is also a necessary component 
of political gerrymandering cases.73 Additionally, in its most recent 
68. See id. at 340. 
69. The Court noted that if the allegations contained in the complaint were 
true, "the conclusion would be irresistible, tantamount for all practical purposes 
to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with 
segregating white and colored voters." Id at 341. This language sounds in 
purpose. However, in the next paragraph, the Court went on to say that "[ilt is 
difficult to appreciate what stands in the way of adjudging a statute having this 
inevitable effect invalid." Id at 342. 
70. In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 
U.S. 252 (1977), the Court described Gomillion as a case where "a clear pattern, 
unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the state 
action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face." Id at 266. 
71. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 U.S. 55 (1980); cf. id. at 113 (Marshall, ]., dissenting). 
72. See, e.g., Lodge, 458 U.S. at 613; Bolden, 446 U.S. at 55; if. id at 113 
(Marshall,]., dissenting) (arguing that vote dilution cases should be decided under 
the principle that "if a classification 'impinges upon a fundamental right 
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, ... strict judicial scrutiny' 
is required, ... regardless of whether the infringement was intentional" (citations 
omitted). 
73. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127, 129 (1986) ("[1]n order to 
succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove . . • intentional 
discrimination against an identifiable political group .... As long as redistricting 
is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove that the likely 
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racial districting cases, the Coun has made clear that an intent to 
segregate voters by race is crucial to a claimed constitutional 
violation.74 
The Coun has never offered a complete theoretical justification 
for distinguishing between these two lines of authority,75 so it is 
difficult to know whether a purpose or effects test is appropriate on 
the facts of Bush v. Gore. The imponant point, though, is that the 
Coun's ultimate conclusion cannot be justified regardless of the test 
utilized 
Suppose that the recount procedure authorized by the Florida 
Supreme Coun is analogized to malapportioned legislatures or 
absolute deprivations of the right to vote. Then, we would ask only 
whether a panicular group of voters were deprived of the franchise 
and not worry about whether the decision in question was meant 
to bring about this state of affairs.76 But as noted above, under this 
test, both a stringent uniform rule and a forgiving uniform rule 
would be unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling state 
interest, because both rules have the effect of depriving someone of 
their franchise rights. A uniformly stringent rule prejudices voting 
dimplers, while a uniformly forgiving rule prejudices abstaining 
dimplers.77 
This problem, in tum, suggests both reasons why a purpose test 
is sometimes attractive and a way of identifying the sorts of 
problems for which it is appropriate. When the legislature 
completely deprives someone of the right to vote, or when it draws 
district lines that violate the one-person, one-vote requirement, the 
political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.") 
74. See, e.g., Hunt v. Cromartie, 121 S. Ct. 1452, 1458 (2001) (holding that 
the issue was whether "the legislature's motive was predominantly racial, not 
political"). 
75. Cf. Bolden, 446 U.S. at 130 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that "at 
various times the Court's decisions have seemed to adopt three inconsistent 
approaches: (1) that purpose alone is the test for unconstitutionality; (2) that 
effect alone is the test; and (3) that purpose or effect, either alone or in 
combination, is sufficient to show unconstitutionality"). 
76. See supra p. 977-78. 
77. See supra p. 974-75. 
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problem can be corrected simply by extending the franchise or 
obeying the population equality requirement. An effects test is 
therefore appropriate. In contrast, in other circumstances, an effects 
test can lead to a finding of discrimination against some group 
regardless of what the government does. For example, Tuskeegee 
had to draw its city boundary lines somewhere.78 Whatever location 
it chose, the effect of its decision would be to exclude some group 
of potential voters: hence, the requirement that those challenging 
the decision demonstrate a purpose of excluding African-
Americans?9 Similarly" however a legislature draws district lines, 
the decision will have some effect on the distribution of political 
power: hence, the requirement that those challenging the lines 
demonstrate that they were drawn in order to produce this 
distribution.80 
H this analysis is correct, then Bush v. Gore may have been an 
appropriate case for application of a purpose test because, as already 
noted, any rule would have disadvantaged some people. But 
insistence on such a test does not rescue the Court's opinion. On 
the contrary, a striking fact about the Court's approach is that it 
engaged in no inquiry into purpose. Perhaps the Court suspected 
that Democrats were manipulating the rules to favor Al Gore, but 
the Court never made this claim. There was no showing in the 
record that the potential inconsistencies the Court discovered were 
intended to disfranchise one group of voters or another, and the 
Court insisted upon none. For all that appears, the putative 
differences in treatment resulted from an entirely good faith effort 
to make the best decisions possible under extremely trying 
circumstances. 
The upshot, then, is that the opinion will not withstand analysis 
whichever test one uses. H an effects test is appropriate, then the 
Court failed to explain why the uniform standard it insisted upon 
did not have the unconstitutional effect of not respecting the wishes 
of either the voting or nonvoting dimplers. H a purpose test is 
78. See Gomillian v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
79. See id. 
80. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
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appropriate, then the Court failed explain its failure to discern a 
purpose of disfranchising anyone. 
Matters are made worse when one considers the problem of a 
countervailing state interest. On conventional equal protection 
analysis, even deprivations of fundamental rights are justified if the 
countervailing interest is "compelling. ,,81 Yet the Bush Court did 
not pause to consider whether there were such interests at all, much 
less how strong they were. 
Two interests suggest themselves. The first is local control. For 
better or worse, Florida election administration is decentralized. 
Different counties use different equipment, have different rules, and 
have widely differing error rates.82 The Florida Supreme Court left 
this local control intact by refusing to impose a uniform standard 
and by vesting the task of conducting the recount in local officials. 
Of course, an inevitable result of local control is local variation, 
and variation can always be characterized as discrimination. Is local 
control a compelling state interest that justifies this sort of 
discrimination when it differentially affects the right to vote? In 
other contexts, the Court has placed great emphasis on 
decentralization. For example, it has held that unequal funding for 
education is constitutionally permissible when supported by the 
interest in local control83 and that otherwise required desegregation 
plans cannot be imposed when they might require the breaching of 
81. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (holding that at certain 
points in pregnancy, a state's "interests become sufficiently compelling to" 
overcome a woman's fundamental right to an abortion); if. Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236-37 (1995) (holding that compelling 
state interest test does not mean that strict scrutiny is necessarily "fatal in fact") 
(quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in judgment». 
82. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5604 (West 2000) (authorizing the board of 
county commissioners of any county to purchase and "provide for the use of any 
electronic or electromechanical voting system approved by the Department of 
State"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.012 (West 2000) (giving local election boards 
power to conduct voting); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.031(1) (West 2000) (giving 
local election boards power to maintain order at polls); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§102.141 (West 2000) (setting out duties of county canvassing boards). 
83. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,54-55 (1973). 
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local, jurisdictional boundaries.84 
Perhaps voting, unlike education or integration, is sufficiently 
important to outweigh the arguments for local control, but the 
Court nowhere suggests that it is. Such a suggestion would have 
revolutionary implications, requiring the rewriting of election laws 
throughout the country. More to the point, the Court's decision in 
Bush itself left in place pre-recount results, certified by local boards 
using widely different equipment and employing different rules. In 
contrast, the Florida Court made clear that the state-wide recount 
procedure would be administered by a single judge, who would 
have had the task of unifying and rationalizing local recounts if the 
procedure had been allowed to run its course. Hence, if local 
control is really not a sufficiently important countervailing state 
interest to justify nonuniformity, it is hard to understand why it 
was not the underlying election, rather than the recount procedure, 
that was unconstitutional. 
This difficulty suggests that the Court's liberal apologists, who 
have argued that Bush v. Gore presages a major constitutional assault 
on state election laws,85 have misinterpreted the decision. Samuel 
Issacharoff, for example, has argued that the rule established in Bush 
v. Gore 
obviously cannot be limited to the recount process alone. 
The court condemns the fact that "standards for accepting 
or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from 
county to county but indeed within a single county.» That 
criticism would surely apply to the variations in voting 
machines across Florida, and, for that matter, to similar 
variations in all other states. The court's new standard may 
create a more robust constitutional examination of voting 
practices.86 
Well, maybe. There is no way to know what future courts will 
84. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974). 
85. See Issacharoff, supra note 10. 
86.Id (quoting Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,106 (2000». 
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make of past decisions. One thing we do know, however, is that the 
Bush majority did everything within its power to avoid a broad 
interpretation of its decision. The Court is careful to observe that 
"[0 ]ur consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the 
problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents 
many complexities."87 This qualification, apparently inserted at the 
insistence of Justice O'Connor,88 makes it about as clear as possible 
that the Court wanted its decision to be treated like a restricted 
railroad ticket "good for this day and train only."89 
The Court goes on to note that "[t]he question before the Court 
is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their expertise, may 
develop different systems for implementing elections. Instead, we 
are presented with a situation where a state court with the power 
to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal 
procedural safeguards."9O This distinction is incoherent. Surely a 
state court should be allowed to displace only so much of the 
statutory scheme as is necessary to provide a remedy. If local 
control is a sufficiently compelling interest to justify statewide 
statutes that permit discrimination between residents living in 
different parts of the state, then a state court is also justified when 
it leaves this local control intact. But whether the distinction is 
coherent or not, the Supreme Court obviously takes it seriously. 
Otherwise, there is no explanation for the Court's decision, which 
had the effect of restoring the totally decentralized system that 
produced massive differences in voting procedures and error rates 
throughout the state. 
This problem leads to the second compelling state interest that 
might have justified the recount-an interest that, ironically, is not 
87. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,109 (2000). 
88. See Jeffrey Rosen, A Majority alOne, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2001, § 6, at 
32. 
89. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts,J., dissenting) 
("[T]he instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends 
to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad 
ticket, good for this day and train only."). 
90. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. 
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countervailing at all. It is the very interest that the Court purported 
to defend: the interest in an equal right to vote. The Florida Court 
might plausibly have believed that this right was denied by the 
undercounting of large numbers of ballots. The recount was 
designed to correct just this inequality. Of course, as indicated 
above, the recount had the potential to introduce inequality as well. 
In a perfect world, with infinite time, the Florida court might have 
fashioned a recount scheme that more closely tracked the intent of 
each voter. But surely the appropriate comparison is not with a 
hypothetical perfect world, but with the real world that the Vnited 
States Supreme Court created by its decision. On that standard, the 
Florida court plainly did a better job of avoiding the constitutional 
difficulty identified by the V nited States Supreme Court than the 
V nited States Supreme Court itself did. In order to prevent some 
disputed ballots from being ignored, the Vnited States Supreme 
Court required that all be ignored. It thereby achieved an equality 
of sorts between classes of voters casting "undervotes" or 
"overvotes," but only by creating massive inequality between these 
disfranchised citizens on the one hand and the citizens whose votes 
counted on the other. 
2. The Mythical § 5 Deadline 
Neither the Florida court nor the V nited States Supreme Court 
would have been put to this hard choice but for the putative 
December 12 deadline supposedly imposed by 3 V.S.C. § 5.91 But 
for this deadline, any deficiencies in the Florida recount procedure 
could have been corrected. It is therefore important to understand 
that the deadline had no basis in law. It was manufactured out of 
whole cloth by the Supreme Court itself. 
As even the Supreme Court acknowledged, § 5 offers a "safe 
harbor" rather than requiring Florida to complete the selection 
process by December 12.92 The statute provides that 
91.3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
92. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000). 
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If [a] final determination of any controversy or contest 
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of 
[a] State [is] made at least six days before the time fixed for 
the meeting of the electors, [it] shall be conclusive, and shall 
govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in 
the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the 
ascertainment of the electors appointed by [the] State is 
concerned.93 
This language makes clear that Florida was under no statutory 
obligation to resolve the dispute by December 12. The statute 
might nonetheless have provided a strong incentive for Florida to 
do so. If it were true that Florida might be subject to a federal 
resolution of a dispute that it would rather settle itself, then the 
state might have a good reason to incorporate the § 5 deadline into 
its own law. But it is bizarre for the Court to rely on Florida's 
interest in settling its own electoral disputes when it was the United 
States Supreme Court that displaced Florida's resolution with the 
federal resolution that it mandated. Instead of a shield protecting 
state processes, the Supreme Court turned § 5 into a sword, 
preventing those processes from running their course.94 Moreover, 
it is far from clear that § 5 creates a "safe harbor" or, conversely, 
that failure to meet the § 5 deadline would permit a federal 
resolution. First, the entire procedure set forth in Title III is of 
doubtful constitutionality.95 By its terms, the Twelfth Amendment 
93. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
94. Of course, the Florida legislature might have been concerned about a 
settlement imposed by the Florida courts. But that concern would not have 
provided a motive for the legislature to adopt the § 5 deadline. As employed by 
the Supreme Coun, the deadline had the effect of transferring the entire 
controversy to the federal level. It precluded both the state court, and the state 
legislature, from resolving the dispute. 
95. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy andDisorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 695, 
697 (2001). As Richard Pildes notes, seven dissenting members of the House 
Committee that reported the Electoral Count Act of 1887 advanced powerful 
constitutional arguments against it. See id. at 697 n.l0 (2001) (citing Electoral 
Count Act, 49th Cong., 2d Sess., in 18 Congo Rec. H. 47 (Dec. 8, 1866) (Rep. 
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limits the role of Congress to that of spectator. It requires no more 
than the "presence" of Representatives and Senators while "the 
votes shall ... be counted.,,96 Unlike Article I, Section 5, which 
makes Congress "the Judge of the Elections, Returns and 
Qualifications of its own Members, ,,97 the Constitution provides no 
textual support for the notion that Congress has the authority to 
resolve or cut off a dispute about the legality of a presidential 
election. 
Of course, the necessary and proper clause authorizes Congress 
to enact legislation "for carrying into Execution [the powers] 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.,,98 But the necessary and proper clause is not a warrant for 
disobeying other sections of the Constitution.99 To the extent that 
the § 5 procedure "resolved" a dispute in a fashion that negated the 
state legislature's power to "appoint [electors] in such Manner as 
... [it] may direct,,,lOO Congress lacks the constitutional authority to 
give it conclusive force. Thus, as a constitutional matter, it is 
doubtful that § 5 can insulate a slate of electors against claims that 
they were selected in a fashion contrary to that specified by the 
state legislature. 
It is possible that the Supreme Court would hold that the 
constitutionality of § 5 is a nonjusticiable political question.101 But 
Dibble)). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. n, § 1, d. 3. 
97. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, d. 1. 
98. U.S. CONST. art. n, § 8, d. 18. 
99. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) 
(observing that implied powers of Congress do not extend to cases where 
"measures •.. are prohibited by the constitution."). 
100. U.S. CONST. art. IT, § 1, d. 2. 
101. SeeCalabresi, supra note 2 (arguing that the Supreme Court should have 
left the election controversy to the political branches). As Samuel Issacharoff 
makes clear, the Electoral Count Act was motivated, at least in part, by the 
desire to keep the courts out of presidential election disputes. See Samuel 
Issacharoff, Political Judgments, 68 U. Cm. L. REv. 637, 652 (2001); cf. Dorf & 
Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 934 (suggesting that "when- -as in Bush v. Gore . .. -
the substantive political payoff of any procedural regime can be clearly predicted, 
any attempt to ground judicial intervention in legal principle will be read as a 
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the Court's willingness to adjudicate the dispute in Bush v. Gore102 
itself substantially reduces the probability of such a holding. 
Moreover, the putative nonjusticiability of § 5 actually reduces its 
effectiveness as a safe harbor. A court that would not adjudicate the 
constitutionality of § 5 presumably would not enforce it either, 
thereby leaving to Congress the decision whether to give conclusive 
weight to a state determination reached before the deadline. If § 5 
is unenforceable, then it is hardly a safe harbor. And even if § 5 
were constitutional, and even if the Court would enforce its terms, 
it is doubtful that Congress would be bound by it. Congress cannot 
prevent itself from repealing its own prior legislation,I03 and a 
Congress that chose not to follow the terms of § 5 could simply put 
in place another procedure inconsistent with it. 
For all these reasons, there was little cause for Florida to be 
concerned about the § 5 deadline. Still, it is not the function of the 
Supreme Court to weigh the wisdom of a state legislative decision. 
If the Florida legislature decided to incorporate the § 5 deadline 
into its own law, the Supreme Court would be bound by this 
decision. But the Florida legislature did no such thing. There is no 
language in the Florida code remotely suggesting that election 
contests had to be completed before December 12. T ellingly, the 
Supreme Court majority cites no such language. Instead, it relied on 
a statement made by the Florida Supreme Court.104 According to 
political smokescreen"}. 
102.531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
103. For good discussions, see Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman and the 
Capacity a/Congress to Control theFuture, 13 HAsTINGSCONST. L.Q. 185 (1986); 
Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and 
Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 381. 
104. The majority does better than Chief Justice Rehnquist, who relies on 
the United States Supreme Court's own prior statement. He writes that "[t]he 
scope and nature of the remedy ordered by the Florida Supreme Court 
jeopardizes the 'legislative wish' to take advantage of the safe harbor provided by 
3 U.S.C. § 5." [d. at 120-21 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). A casual reader might 
suppose that the interior quotation comes from the Florida Court's 
interpretation of Florida law. Instead, the reference is to the United States 
Supreme Court's own prior decision, in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Ed. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 120-21. The referenced language is worth quoting in its 
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the per curiam, "[t]he Supreme Court of Florida has said that the 
legislature intended the State's electors to 'participate fully in the 
federal electoral process,' as provided in 3 U.S.C. § 5."105 
It is important to understand that the Florida court made the 
statement upon which the United States Supreme Court relied in 
a radically different context. The Florida court mentioned the § 5 
deadline in conjunction with the establishment of a timetable for 
completion of the protest phase.106 Until the protest was resolved, 
the Florida Secretary of State could not certify a winner of the 
election.107 Without a certified winner, the names of the winning 
electors could not be forwarded to Washington.108 There was 
therefore some possibility, albeit remote, that the state's electors 
might be unable to participate. In contrast, the contest phase begins 
only after the electors are certified.109 The Florida court never held 
that the contest phase had to be completed before December 12. 
entirety: 
The Florida Supreme Court cited 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10 in a footnote of its 
opinion . . . hut did not discuss § 5. Since § 5 contains a principle of 
federal law that would assure finality of the State's determination if 
made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative 
wish to take advantage of the "safe harbor" would counsel against any 
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a 
change in the law.. 
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (emphasis 
added), rev'g 772 So. 2d 1220 (pIa. 2000). This transmogrification of the United 
States Supreme Court's groundless speculation about a possible legislative wish 
relating to a different part of the Florida code into a holding of the Florida 
Supreme Court is enough to give bootstrapping a bad name. 
105. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110 (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. 
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1284 (pIa. 2000». 
106. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1289. 
107. See id. (delaying certification until completion of protest phase). 
108. See 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (providing that the executive of each state shall 
send certificate of ascertainment of the electors appointed "as soon as practicable 
after the conclusion of the appointment of the electors in such State by the final 
ascertainment, under and in pursuance of the laws of such State providing for 
such ascertainment" Id). 
109. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (1) (Supp. 2001) (providing that 
certification may be contested in Circuit Court). 
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Indeed, it seems to have said something like the opposite: 
The need for prompt resolution and finality is especially 
critical in presidential elections where there is an outside 
deadline established by federal law. Notwithstanding, 
consistent with the legislative mandate and our precedent, 
although the time constraints are limited, we must do 
everything required by law to ensure that legal votes that 
have not been counted are included in the final election 
results. 110 
Justice Shaw dissented from this conclusion and agreed with the 
United States Supreme Court that a statewide recount during the 
contest phase was unlawfu1.111 Yet even Justice Shaw could not 
accept the United States Supreme Court's tendentious reading of 
Florida law. As he wrote after the United States Supreme Coun 
prohibited the recount: 
December 12 was not a "drop dead" date under Florida law. 
In fact, I question whether any date prior to January 6 is a 
drop-dead date under the Florida election scheme. 
December 12 was simply a permissive "safe-harbor" date to 
which the states could aspire. It certainly was not a 
mandatory contest deadline under the plain language of the 
Florida Election Code (i.e., it is not mentioned there) or 
this Court's prior rulingS.112 
Perhaps a majority of Justice Shaw's colleagues would have 
disagreed with him had they been given the chance, although there 
is nothing in their previous opinions suggesting that they would 
have done so. In any event, they were never given the chance. 
Instead of remanding the question for a holding by the Florida 
110. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261 (FIa. 2000) (emphasis added). 
111. See id. at 127()"73 (Shaw, J., concurring in dissent by Justice Harding). 
112. Gore v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 528-29 (FIa. 2000) (Shaw, J., 
concurring). 
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court, the United States Supreme Court simply manufactured such 
a holding, thereby abruptly prohibiting the recount pursuant to an 
implausible interpretation of state law never adopted by any 
court.1l3 
In order to fabricate this statutory requirement in the absence 
of any statutory language, the Supreme Court resoned to a double 
standard that can only be described as cynical. It was, after all, the 
United States Supreme Court that had earlier chastised the Florida 
113. Nelson Lund has argued that the Supreme Court in fact gave the 
Florida court the opportunity to "reexamine the state law question itself." 
Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness o/Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 
(forthcoming). Lund insists that "[c]ontrary to a widespread misperception, the 
Supreme Court did not forbid the Florida court from attempting to conduct a 
statewide recount under constitutionally permissible standards." On this view, 
the failure of the Florida Court to address this issue must be attributed to Al 
Gore, who declined to ask the state court to do so. 
This eccentric reading of the Supreme Court's actions amounts to blaming 
the victim. Is it conceivable that Lund and other conservative defenders of the 
Bush position would have adopted the same stance if Vice President Gore had in 
fact sought a recount in the teeth of the Supreme Court's decision and if the 
Florida court had ordered one? How plausible is it that the United States 
Supreme Court would have silently accepted such an action by the Florida 
court? 
Lund derives his conclusion from the fact that the Supreme Court remanded 
the case "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion," rather than 
ordering an outright dismissal. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). 
Unfortunately for Lund's argument, the opinion with which the further 
proceedings could not be inconsistent was very clear. In his dissenting opinion, 
Justice Breyer endorsed the possibility of remanding the case to the Florida court 
to consider conducting a constitutionally permissible recount. See id. at 146. The 
majority explicitly rejected this possibility: 
Because the Florida Supreme Court has said that the Florida Legislature 
intended to obtain the safe-harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5, JUSTICE 
BREYER's proposed remedy-remanding to the Florida Supreme Court 
for its ordering of a constitutionally proper contest until December 
18-contemplates action in violation of the Florida Election Code, and 
hence could not be part of an "appropriate" order authorized by FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (Supp.2001). 
Id. at 111. Surely, a decision on remand that a recount was indeed "part of an 
'appropriate' order" would have been "inconsistent with [the Supreme Court's] 
opinion" and, therefore, in violation of the remand order. 
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court for going beyond the state statutory framework in violation 
of Article II.114 Perhaps the Florida Court did indeed exceed the 
normal bounds of statutory construction when it extended the 
length of the protest period, but at least the Florida court pointed 
to provisions in the statute that arguably supported its 
conclusion.us In contrast, the United States Supreme Court gave 
dispositive weight to an interpretation of state law unsupported by 
any statutory language contained anywhere in the Florida code. 
Thus, the Supreme Court's final decision is in blatant violation of 
its own interpretation of Article II. 
114. See supra pp. 967-69. 
115. The Florida court held that the provisions of Florida law providing for 
manual recounts conflicted with the provision establishing a seven-day deadline 
for election boards to submit their returns to the Elections Canvassing 
Commission. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 
1285-87 (Fla. 2000). Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West 1982 & Supp. 
2001) (providing for manual recounts) with id. §§ 102.111-.112 (providing that 
boards must submit their returns to Elections Canvassing Commission by the 
seventh day following the election). The Florida court stated: 
Although the Code sets no specific deadline by which a manual recount 
must be completed, the time required to complete a manual recount 
must be reasonable. Otherwise, the recount provision would be, in 
effect, meaningless. • . • The recount provision thus conflicts with 
sections 102.111 and 102.112, which state that the Boards "must" submit 
their returns to the Elections Canvassing Commission by 5 p.m. of the 
seventh day following the election or face penalties •... 
Manual recounts oftentimes may be incomplete on the seventh day 
following the election. In such a case, if the seven-day limit were to be 
strictly enforced, the manual recount provision would be eviscerated 
and rendered meaningless. The Legislature could not have intended such 
a result. The seven-day limit thus must be construed in a flexible 
manner to accommodate the manual recount provision. 
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1285-87. Reasonable people 
might disagree with this interpretation of Florida law, but at least it constitutes 
an effort to interpret statutory language. In contrast, the United States Supreme 
Court cited no language in any Florida statute suggesting that Florida meant to 
incorporate the federal "safe harbor" deadline into its own law. 
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3. The Mythical Article II Problem 
In its first decision, the United States Supreme Court focused on 
the Florida Court's extension of the statutory deadline for 
completion of the protest phase. Without quite saying so, the Court 
implied that this extension might constitute a judicial change of 
Florida election law, prohibited by Article IT, Section 1, Clause 2 
and making unavailable the statutory "safe harbor" provision of 3 
U.S.C. § 5.116 Whatever one thought of this argument, it had 
plainly become moot by the time the Court turned its attention to 
the controversy for a second time. At this point, the protest phase 
had ended, the deadline extension was irrelevant, and the issue 
before the Court was the propriety of a state-wide recount the 
Florida Supreme Court had ordered pursuant to its broad statutory 
powers to administer the contest phase.117 
Undeterred by this embarrassment, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for himself, and Justices Scalia and Thomas, set about 
looking for other instances where the Florida court had 
misunderstood its own law.118 One must note at the outset the 
extraordinary nature of this endeavor. At least since Erie Railroad 
116. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 75-76 
(2000). 
117. Some commentators seem not to have understood this point. For 
example, Richard Epstein devotes a considerable portion of his defense of the 
United States Supreme Court to an argument that the canvassing boards were 
not authorized to conduct the hand recounts that Gore requested in his protest 
and that the Florida Supreme Court erred in ordering an extension of the protest 
period. See Richard Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May 
Direct": The Outcome in Bush v. Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 613, 621-29 
(2001). Even if he is correct about both ofthese points (and it is not clear that he 
is-see supra note 115), they are irrelevant to the legal issues confronting the 
Supreme Court in Bush 7J. Gore, which concerned the contest, rather than the 
protest procedures. Cj McConnell, supra note 2, at 666 (arguing that "by the 
time the case got to the High Court, the new deadline had already passed, 
Governor Bush had been certified the winner, and the legal conflict had moved 
on to a new phase, rendering Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris all 
but moot"). 
118. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring). 
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Co. v. Tompkins,119 it has been clear that state court decisions 
concerning the content of state law are almost always 
constitutionally binding on federal COUrts.120 
Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed that this general rule was 
modified by Article IT, § 1, which requires that presidential electors 
be appointed "in such Manner as the [state legislature] may 
direct.,,121 In support of this assertion, he relied upon a single, 
convoluted sentence of dicta in McPherson v. Blacker,122 which 
suggested that there were federal constitutional limitations on the 
extent to which states could deprive legislatures of the appointment 
function. 123 The sentence, in its entirety, reads as follows: "Hence 
the insertion of those words [providing for the appointment of 
electors in the manner that the state legislature may direct], while 
operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of any attempt to 
circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held to operate as a 
limitation on that power itself. ,,124 
This reliance is ironic to say the least, since McPherson had 
upheld a state court's interpretation of its own statutory scheme 
against federal challenge and strongly rejected federal supervision 
(including federal judicial supervision) of the selection process.125 
Moreover, on the facts before the Court, it is hard to see how 
the "State" was attempting to "'circumscribe the legislative 
power.',,126 In the Court's first consideration of the Article IT 
119.304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
120. See id. 
121. U.S. CONST. art. II; § 1. 
122. 146 U.S. 1 (1892). 
123. See id. at 25. 
124.Id. (emphasis added). 
125. At issue was a Michigan statute directing that some electors be chosen 
by congressional districts, rather than on a state-wide basis. See id. at 24. 
Observing that "[the state] legislative power is the supreme authority except as 
limited by the constitution of the State, and the sovereignty of the people is 
exercised through their representatives in the legislature unless by the 
fundamental law power is elsewhere reposed," Id. at 25, the Court rejected a 
challenge to the statute. 
126. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) 
(quotingMcPher.;on, 146 U.S. at 25). 
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problem, the Justices worried that the Florida court had relied in 
part on the Florida Constitution.l27 Perhaps a state constitutional 
provision could impermissibly "circumscribe" legislative power 
with respect to the selection of electors.128 But Justice Rehnquist 
had no such claim before him in Bush v. Gore. Instead, he was 
confronted with the Florida court's interpretation of its own state's 
statutes. The Florida legislature specifically authorized the Florida 
courts to play this role. Unlike the protest procedure, which is 
administered by state canvassing boards vested with considerable 
discretion as to how to proceed, the contest procedu~e is initiated 
by filing a complaint in the state circuit court.129 The legislature 
chose to provide the court with exceptionally broad powers to 
administer the proceedings, including the power to "fashion such 
orders as [the court] deem[s] necessary to ensure that each allegation 
in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent 
or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate 
under such circumstances. ,,130 
Surely, the legislature intended the state courts to engage in the 
ordinary process of statutory construction in the coursc~ of applying 
the statutory scheme. Of course, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed 
that the construction adopted by the Florida court was not 
127. See id. (observing that "[t]here are expressions in the opinion of the 
Supreme Court of Florida that may be read to indicate that it construed the 
Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the Florida 
Constitution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, d. 2 'circumscribE: the legislative 
power"'). 
128. Although the Court relied upon McPherson v. Blacker in ,expressing this 
concern, see Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76, there is language 
in McPherson that cuts the other way. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25 ("What is 
forbidden or required to be done by a State is forbidden or r.equired of the 
legislative power under state constitutions as they exist."). 
129. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102-168(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 2001); cf. FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 102.171 (West Supp. 2001) (providing that "[t]he jurisdiction to 
hear any contest of the election of a member of either house of the Legislature 
is vested in the applicable house, as each house, pursuant to § 2, Art. ill of the 
State Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns 
of its members."). 
130. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001). 
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"ordinary.,,131 But rules concerning the appropriate techniques of 
statutory construction do not make up a "'transcendental body of 
law outside of any particular State,,,132 any more than the common 
law does. What counts as "ordinary" construction is, itself, a matter 
for state law. In the special context of the selection of electors, 
Article n vests this lawmaking power in the state legislature, and 
not in the federal courts. 
Perhaps if the state legislature meant to delegate this authority 
to the federal courts, Anicle n would require couns to respect this 
decision. But to the extent that we can infer a legislative intent 
about this matter at all, it appears far more likely that the Florida 
legislature intended for Florida couns to have the last word on how 
state law should be construed. As noted above, the legislature vested 
the state courts with authority to administer the contest 
procedures.133 In contrast, the state legislature made no provision 
for a United States Supreme Coun role and there is no indication 
whatever that it meant for the federal couns to have the ultimate 
authority to interpret the state statutes at issue. 
Obviously, federal couns do not require state permission to 
review federal questions arising in state coun, and, indeed, any 
effort to foreclose such review would, itself, have been 
unconstitutional.134 Still, the particular federal question at issue here 
was whether the state coun had "circumscribed" state legislative 
power in violation of Anicle n.135 Answering that question, in 
tum, requires discerning the legislature'S intent regarding how 
disputed questions about the interpretation of the statutory scheme 
should be resolved. Since the legislature clearly contemplated a 
state judicial role in the contest procedures and was silent 
131. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000). 
132. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Black 
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes,}., dissenting). 
133. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001). 
134. See generally Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) 
(holding that state courts are bound by United States Supreme Court 
interpretations of federal law). 
135. See supra p. 993. 
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concerning an analogous federal role,136 it seems plausible to assume 
that it meant for state, rather than federal judges to have the final 
word on disputed issues of state law. Hence, there is a good 
argument that Chief Justice Rehnquist's insistence on the primacy 
of his reading of Florida law137 itself amounts to an unconstitutional 
effort to "circumscribe" state legislative power. 
In any event, the particular instances of putative judicial 
misinterpretation identified by Chief Justice Rehnquist are 
singularly unconvincing. In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing 
Board,138 the Florida court's extension of a clearly articu.lated seven-
day deadline for completion of the protest phase troubled the 
Supreme Court.B9 To be sure, the state court offered plausible 
reasons why the legislature could not have intended th(! deadline to 
render nugatory the underlying protest right,14O but one can 
nevertheless understand the concern triggered when a court ignores 
the "plain meaning" of statutory language. In contrast, there simply 
is no such "plain meaning" objection to the state court's 
interpretation of the contest statute. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified two problems with the 
Florida court's interpretation of Florida law. First, he complained 
that the Florida court "empt[ied] certification of virtually all legal 
consequence during the contest, [thereby] ... depart[ing] from the 
provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature. ,,141 But it is telling 
that the Chief Justice cited no specific provision of the code that the 
state court departed from in its treatment of the contest phase. In 
fact, there is no such provision. 
The code establishes two separate procedures for challenging 
election results. First, any candidate or elector is entitled to protest 
the returns to the appropriate canvassing board.142 In <:::onjunction 
136. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001). 
137. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
138.531 U.S. 70 (2000). 
139. See id. at 78. 
140. See supra note 115. 
141. Bush, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
142. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Supp. 2001). 
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with this protest, a candidate or political party can request that the 
canvassing board conduct a manual recount.H3 The canvassing 
board is given discretion to conduct a test recount. 144 If this recount 
"indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the 
outcome of the election, ,,145 the board is given the option to 
[m]anually recount all ballots. ,,146 
Second, after canvassing board has completed its work and the 
election is certified, the unsuccessful candidate or any elector or 
taxpayer is authorized to file a contest with the circuit court.147 The 
statute lists a number of grounds for contesting the election, 
including "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change 
or place in doubt the result of the election"l48 and "[a]ny other cause 
or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person other 
than the successful candidate was the person duly •.. elected."H9 
The circuit judge, in tum, is authorized to "fashion such orders as 
he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the 
complaint is ... examined"150 and to "provide any relief appropriate 
under such circumstances. ,,151 
Nothing in this scheme remotely suggests that the circuit court 
should be bound during the contest phase by canvassing board 
decisions rendered during the protest phase. On the contrary, the 
statute provides that the canvassing board is to be named as the 
defendant in contest actions,152 with the whole purpose of the 
contest being to challenge canvassing board decisions. The 
legislature might have provided that canvassing board decisions 
should be affirmed unless they were clearly erroneous or 
143. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(a) (West Supp. 2001). 
144. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(4)(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
145. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001). 
146. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5)(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
147. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Supp. 2001) .. 
148. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
149. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(e) (West Supp. 2001). 
150.Id. 
151. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001). 
152. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(4) (West Supp. 2001). 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 998 2001-2002
998 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:953 
constituted an abuse of discretion. It did not do SO.15.1 Instead, it 
authorized the circuit judge to determine for herself whether the 
board had "reject[ed] ... a number of legal votes sufficient to 
change or place in doubt the result of the election. "154 ChiefJustice 
Rehnquist's reliance on the fact that the code "cllearly vests 
discretion whether to recount in the boards, and sets strict deadlines 
subject to the Secretary's rejection of late tallies and mo netary fines 
for tardiness,,155 is therefore misplaced. Canvassing boards are given 
discretion whether to order recounts156 and are subject to a 
statutory deadline for completing their work during the protest 
phase.157 But once that work is completed, the statute also provides 
a mechanism through which its ultimate decisi()n can be 
overturned. It clearly grants the circuit court the powe:r to "ensure 
that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or 
checked"158 and to "correct any alleged wrong."159 It is the Chief 
Justice's refusal to acknowledge these broad powers, rather than the 
Florida Court's reliance upon them, that distorts the statutory 
scheme. 
Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist's refusal to heed. the "plain 
language" of the statute would be defensible if th:~t language 
153. The election code provides that "[t]he certificate of election which is 
issued to any person shall be prima facie evidence of the election of such person." 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.155 (West Supp. 2001). This provision (~ablishes no 
more than that a person challenging the certification has the bW'den of going 
forward. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 579 (7thed. 1999) (defining "prima facie 
evidence" as "[e]vidence that will establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless 
contradictory evidence is produced"). If the drafters had intended the contesting 
party to establish an abuse of discretion or clear and convincing evidence of a 
legal error, they surely would not have said that a certificate est.ablishes only 
prima facie evidence of election. 
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Supp. 2001). 
155. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.]., (:oncurring). 
156. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Supp. 2001) (authorizing 
manual recounts during protest phase). 
157. SeeFLA.STAT.ANN.§ 102.122 (WestSupp.2001) (establishing deadline 
for submission of returns). 
158.ld 
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (West Supp. 2001). 
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produced an absurd outcome. Rehnquist hints that this might be his 
view when he accuses the Florida court of" empt[ying] certification 
of virtually all legal consequence. ,,160 What purpose is served by the 
protest procedure, one might ask, if a court is empowered to review 
de novo all of the canvassing board decisions? 
Given his own criticism of the Florida Supreme Court for 
ignoring the supposed plain meaning of the statute so as to avoid 
what it considered an absurd result, Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
implicit endorsement of this mode of statutory construction might 
strike some as ironic. In any event, the concept of de novo review 
is hardly anomalous, and we do not generally regard statutory 
schemes creating such review as absurd. For example, some states 
provide for trial of minor offenses before a judge, with an absolute 
right to retrial de novo before a jury if the defendant is dissatisfied 
with the outcome.161 All appellate systems provide for de novo 
review of legal determinations made by lower courts. Indeed, the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed de novo the Florida court's 
interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause.162 Does that review 
empty the Florida appellate process "of virtually all legal 
consequence,,?I63 
As a matter of judicial administration, perhaps schemes creating 
160. Bush, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring). 
161. For Supreme Court decisions discussing these schemes, see Blackledge 
v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972). 
162. See supra p. 972-73. 
163. Richard Epstein is thus mistaken when he asserts that "[ilt makes no 
sense to read the statute as though the contest phase is wholly unconnected with 
anything that went on at the protest stage. If so, then there is no need to bother 
to wait until the protest is over for the contest to begin." Epstein, supra note 117, 
at 630. As Epstein must surely know, the law sometimes requires parties to 
exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking legal relief, even in 
circumstances where judges are permitted to disregard the administrative 
fmdings. As noted in the text, resort to administrative remedies may avoid the 
necessity of litigation by providing the relief that a party seeks or by convincing 
a party that litigation will be fruidess. Even if judges decide the question de 
novo, they may make use of fact finding accomplished during the administrative 
proceeding, or they may, in their discretion, choose to defer to administrative 
legal determinations. 
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duplicative procedures are foolish, but they cenainly are not 
absurd. Even though a pany has the right to challenge the initial 
determination, she may choose not to exercise that right, 
particularly if the facts and arguments developed during the initial 
determination bring home the reality that success is unlikely. And 
if the losing party does challenge the determination, work done 
during the initial phase may assist the factfinder in the later phase. 
For example, in this very case, the Florida Supreme Coun was able 
to utilize some recount results reached during the protest phase.l64 
Moreover, unlike the double trial procedures described above and 
ordinary appellate review, a litigant does not have an automatic 
right to utilize the contest procedure.165 The statute requires a pany 
contesting an election to file a complaint setting fonh one or more 
of five grounds for contesting the election, including "[r]eceipt of 
a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes 
sufficient to change orplace in doubt the result o/the election. ,,166 In the 
vast majority of elections, no party will be able to make plausible 
allegations to this effect. The contest procedure will therefore be 
unavailable, and the protest result will be dispositive. 
The second problem the Chief Justice discerned related to the 
Florida coun's interpretation of the term "legal votes.,,167 
According to Rehnquist, there was no showing of a "'rejection of 
a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the 
result of the election,,,168 because votes are "legal" only when voters 
have followed posted instructions.169 When voters fail to follow 
these instructions (by, for example, failing to remove hanging chads 
from their ballots) and when the ballots are not counted because the 
"electronic or electromechanical equipment performs precisely in 
164. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla. 2000) (holding that in 
contest phase, court can rely upon vote-counting completed during protest 
phase). 
165. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.118 (West Supp. 2001). 
166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c} (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added). 
167. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,118 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring). 
168. Id at 117 (Rehnquist, C.]., concurring) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 102.168(3)(c} (West Supp. 2001». 
169.Id at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
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the manner designed, ,,170 legal votes have not been cast. 
Once again, the relevant statutes simply will not bear this 
interpretation. Florida law nowhere explicitly defines the term 
"legal votes." The Chief Justice derives his definition from the fact 
that the statute requires voting machines to be "capable of correctly 
counting votes. ,,171 But this derivation rests on an obvious non 
sequitur. It is, of course, possible that the equipment Florida 
utilized met the statutory requirement, but the mere existence of 
the requirement does nothing to prove that it was met. The 
existence of the requirement does not show that the machines in 
fact correctly counted all legal votes or that they "perform[ed] 
precisely in the manner designed."I72 Indeed, if the requirement 
itself provided such assurance, it is hard to see why Florida law 
would provide for manual recounts designed to uncover machine 
error.173 
Chief Justice Rehnquist states that precincts using punch-card 
ballots posted instructions directing voters to make cenain that 
they cleanly punched their ballots and removed hanging cha~.174 
This statement is demonstrably false. In support of it, he cites to a 
dissenting opinion by Judge Tjoflat in an earlier case decided by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.175 But the very 
footnote cited by the Chief Justice makes clear that the quoted 
170.Id. 
171. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5606(4) (West Supp. 2001). 
172. Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
173. Judge Posner makes a similar error in his attack on the Florida Supreme 
Court's decision. He writes "[t]he machinery for counting punchcard ballots 
which are the form of ballot used in 40 percent of Florida's counties, containing 
63 percent of the state's population, was not designed to tabulate dimpled or 
otherwise unpunched-through ballots; so how could its failure to count such 
ballots be thought an error in tabulation?" Posner, supra note 2, at 726. The 
undefended premise behind the reasoning is that a putative defect in the vote 
counting machinery could not possibly be a defect if it was sufficiently 
widespread. 
174. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
175.Seeid. at 109 (citing Touchston v. McDermott, 234F.3d 1133, 1141n.19 
(11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J. dissenting)). 
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instructions were not posted in all counties.176 Moreover, even if 
they were, it does not follow that the failure to obey these 
instructions (not contained in the statutes themselve:s) makes the 
vote "illegal." On the contrary, the statutory scheme makes clear 
that voter intent, rather than voter error, is the touchstone for 
determining whether and how to count a ballot. Thus, section 
101.5614(5) provides that "[nJo vote shall be declared invalid or 
void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as 
determined by the canvassing board. ,,177 The Chief Justice dismissed 
this provision as "entirely irrelevant,,178 apparently 'because it is 
contained within a section dealing with "damaged or defective"179 
ballots. He seems to have assumed that the section concerns only 
ballots that are "damaged or defective" for reasons other than voter 
error. But the section itself states explicitly that it applies to any 
ballot that" cannot properly be counted by the automatic tabulating 
equipment."180 Moreover, the section clearly contemplates voter 
error. Thus, section 101.5614(6) provides that " [iJf an elector marks 
more names than there are persons to be elected to an office or if it 
is impossible to determine the elector's choice, the el~!ctor's ballot 
shall not be counted for that office. ,,181 The clear implication of this 
language is that if there are voter errors other than marking more 
names than there are persons to be elected and if it is possible to 
determine the elector's choice, the ballot shall be counted. 
176. The footnote reads as follows: 
Instructions to voters in Palm Beach County, a county that uses punch 
card technology, read: "After voting, check your ballot card to be sure 
your voting sections are clearly and cleanly punched and th.ere are no 
chips left hanging on the back of the card." The instructions ill Broward 
County, also a punch card county, read: "To vote, hold the stylus 
vertically. Punch the stylus straight down through the ballot card for 
the candidates or issues of your choice. " 
Touchston v. McDermott, 234F.3d 1133,1141 n.19 (11th Cir. 2000) (fjoflat,J., 
dissenting). 
177. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001). 
178. Bush, 531 U.S. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.}., concurring). 
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Supp. 2001). 
180.Id. 
181. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(6) (West Supp. 2001). 
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Finally, even if the Chief Justice is correct and this section is 
irrelevant, the statutory recount procedure, which plainly is 
relevant, makes clear that the legislature meant to utilize a voter 
intent criterion. Section 102.166(7)(b) provides that "[i]f a counting 
team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot, the 
ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it to 
determine the voter's intent. ,,182 Why bother with such a referral if 
the only appropriate question is whether a voter marked the ballot 
in a fashion that could be read by the machine?l83 
The Chief Justice chastises the Florida Court for ignoring the 
Secretary of State's contrary opinion because, he claims, the 
Secretary "is authorized by law to issue binding interpretations of 
the Election Code. ,,184 At very best, this claim is misleading. In 
support of it, the Chief Justice cites sections 97.012 and 106.23 of 
the Florida code. But section 97.012, which contains a long list of 
the Secretary of State's duties. says not one word about her 
authority to issue binding opinions. ISS Section 106.23 does speak of 
182. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(7}(b) (West. Supp. 2001). 
183. See McConnell, supra note 2, at 664. 
184. Bush v. Gore. 531 U.S. 98.119 (2000) (Rehnquist. C.J., concurring). 
185. The section reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
The Secretary of State is the chief election officer of the state, and it is 
his or her responsibility to: 
(1) Obtain and maintain uniformity in the application, operation, 
and interpretation of the election laws. 
(2) Provide uniform standards for the proper and equitable 
implementation of the registration laws. 
(3) Actively seek out and collect the data and statistics necessary to 
knowledgeably scrutinize the effectiveness of election laws. 
(4) Provide technical assistance to the supervisors of elections on 
voter education and election personnel training services. 
(5) Provide technical assistance to the supervisors of elections on 
voting systems. 
(6) Provide voter education assistance to the public. 
(7) Coordinate the state's responsibilities under the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993. 
(8) Provide training to all affected state agencies on the necessary 
procedures for proper implementation of this chapter. 
(9) Ensure that all registration applications and forms prescribed or 
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binding opinions, but makes clear that the opinions are binding 
only on the person who seeks the opinion or with reference to 
whom the opinion is sought.186 It nowhere states that the Florida 
Supreme Court must accept the opinion.l87 ChiefJustice Rehnquist 
cites Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Committee188 for the 
proposition that "[ t]he Florida Supreme Court ... must defer to the 
Secretary's interpretations. "189 This citation is remarkable. On the 
very page to which the Chief Justice refers, the Krivanek court 
specifically states that although such interpretations are "persuasive 
authority and, if ... reasonable •.. are entitled to great weight"190 
they are "not binding judicial precedent. "191 Just who, one must ask, 
is guilty of distorting Florida law? 
approved by the department are in compliance with the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965. 
(10) Coordinate with the United States Department of Defense so 
that armed forces recruitment offices administer voter registration in a 
manner consistent with the procedures set forth in this code for voter 
registration agencies. 
(11) Create' and maintain a central voter file. 
(12) Maintain a voter fraud hotline and provide election fraud 
education to the public 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 97.012 (West Supp. 2001). 
186. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.23 (West Supp. 2001). 
187. The statute authorizes the Division of Elections to provide advisory 
opinions when requested by various persons. It then states: 
Any such person or organization, acting in good faith upon such an 
advisory opinion, shall not be subject to any criminal penalty provided 
for in this chapter. The opinion, until amended or revoked, shall be 
binding on any person or organization who sought the opinion or with 
reference to whom the opinion was sought, unless material facts were 
omitted or misstated in the request for the advisory opinion. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.23 (West Supp. 2001). 
188. 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993). 
189. Bush, 531 U.S. at 119-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
190. Krivanek, 625 So. 2d at 844. 
191. Id 
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ill. THE DEEP POLITICS OF BUSH v. GORE 
I hope I have said enough to demonstrate that the majority and 
concurring opinions in Bush v. Gore should not be taken seriously. 
Why, then, did the Court reach the conclusion that it did? The 
most obvious explanation is that the Court acted from narrowly 
partisan motives. An extreme version of this theory holds that the 
Court set out to make George Bush the President come what may, 
and that it simply did what needed to be done in order to 
accomplish this goal. A slightly less extreme version holds that the 
justices' political bias caused them to view the Florida court 
decisions that disadvantaged Bush with profound and unjustified 
suspicion. Determined to fight fire with fire, they adopted a 
partisan stance of their own so as to counteract what they honestly, 
but erroneously, thought were outrageous decisions. 
There is no way to disprove these hypotheses, and there is some 
evidence supporting them. After all, if the Court had more 
defensible reasons for the outcome it reached, why did it fail to 
present them in its opinions? Nonetheless, I believe that it is worth 
exploring more respectable, if unarticulated, arguments that 
support the Court's decision. If these arguments in fact motivated 
the Justices, they save the Court from the charge of overt 
partisanship. Unfortunately, however, they also lead to troubling 
contradictions that reach far beyond this particular case. In short, 
they help us to see what really is bad-not just about Bush v. Gore, 
but also about the Court's approach to constitutional adjudication 
more generally. 
A. In Partial Defense of a Political Decision 
Surprisingly, the best entry into these alternative rationales is 
provided by Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion. Justice Ginsburg 
reacted strongly to Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion, 
where he observed that although federal courts "generally defer to 
state courts on the interpretation of state law ... there are ... areas 
in which the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an 
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independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law.,,·192 
In support of this proposition, the Chief Justice cited NAA CP 
v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson,193 and Bouie v. City ofColl1!mbia.194 The 
first case grew out of a concerted and outrageous effort by Alabama 
officials to drive the NAACP from the state.195 After a state conn 
enjoined the NAACP from functioning, Alabama .1ttempted to 
argue that a putative procedural error by the NAACP deprived the 
United States Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review the 
judgment.196 The Supreme Court held that the state's interpretation 
of its own laws was so novel that the NAACP could not be bound 
by it.197 
The second case, Bouie, dealt with criminal convic:tions against 
sit-in demonstrators who were protesting racial segregation in the 
South.198 The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, holding that 
a state court had impermissibly broadened the scope of its own 
trespass statute beyond what a fair reading provided. 199 
Justice Ginsburg reacted to the Chief Just:ice's "casual 
citation,,2°O of these cases with something close to cold fury. Bouie 
and Patterson she argued, were "embedded in historical contexts 
hardly comparable to the situation here.,,20l Patterson was "a case 
decided three months after Cooper v. Aaron, . • . ill the face of 
Southern resistance to the civil rights movement. ,,202 Bouie, too, was 
decided "at the height of the civil rights movement.,,20J The Florida 
Supreme Court, she insisted, "surely should not be bracketed with 
192. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
193.357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
194.378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
195. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 451. 
196. See id. at 454-58. 
197. See id. at 457-58. 
198. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 348-49. 
199.Id. at 362-63. 
200. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. 
202.Id. 
203.Id. 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 1007 2001-2002
2001] OUR UNSETTLED ELECTION 1007 
state high courts of the Jim Crow South. ,,204 
Justice Ginsburg is right to claim. that these cases must be read 
in their historical context.20S Patterson was one of several cases that 
reached the Court in the 1950's and 1960's involving a variety of 
tactics designed to destroy the NAACP.206 The result in Patterson 
itself is unexceptional; the grounds on which Alabama attempted 
to block the NAACP's appeal were obviously pretextual. 
Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that in this and other cases 
involving the NAACP, the Court understood that much more was 
at stake than the particular legal issues formally presented.207 The 
Court saw the cases against the broader backdrop of resistance to its 
still recent decision in Brown v. Board o/Education. 208 For example, 
when Justice Clark indicated that he would dissent in one of the 
cases, Justice Frankfurter warned him against "'a break in the 
unanimity of the Court in what is, after all, part of the whole 
segregation controversy. The sky is none too bright anyhow. The 
mere fact that you are dissenting would be blown up out of all 
proportion to what you yourself would subscribe to.,,,209 
204.Id. at 141. 
205. Later in the Term, the Court itself provided some support for her 
assertion with regard to Bouie. In a case far removed from the racial strife of the 
1960's, it disavowed some of Bouie's dicta. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 457, 
457-58 (2001). 
206. For an account, see MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CML RIGHTS LAW: 
THURGOOD MARsHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-300 
(1994). 
207. As Michael Klarman, perhaps the leading legal historian of race law in 
America, puts the point: 
It is inconceivable that the Justices' view of the case-both on the merits and 
on the alleged state procedural default-was uninfluenced by their 
knowledge that the state of Alabama, including its jurists, were engaged in 
a project of massive resistance to Brown v. BoardofEducation, a fundamental 
part of which involved shutting down the NAACP's operations in the state. 
Klarman, supra note 3, at 1738. 
208. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). " 
209. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LEsHER, INSIDE THE WARREN 
COURT 159 (1983) (quoting Frankfurter's writing to Clark). 
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Ultimately, Clark was persuaded to withdraw his dissent.210 
Similarly, Bouie was one of a large number of cases reaching the 
Court involving the eruption of sit-in demonstrations against 
Southern segregation.211 As David Currie observes, the criminal 
convictions of the demonstrators led the Court into "a long series 
of guerrilla skirmishes to prevent [their] punishment. ,,212 The Court 
"found one excuse after another,,213 to reverse all the convictions on 
a wide variety of theories of varying plausibility.214 As a 
contemporary critic complained, "It would be helpful if these and 
other similar cases could be labeled 'good for use ill sit-in cases 
only.",215 There is no doubt that at least some members of the 
Court understood that a decision upholding the convictions might 
have an adverse impact on the Civil Rights Bill then pending in 
Congress and were motivated in part by the desire not to derail the 
legislation.216 When the Court seemed on the verge of affirming one 
210. See id. 
211. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE Sm'REME COURT: 
THE SECOND CENTURY, 1886-1986, at 383 (1990). 
212.Id. 
213. Id. at 422. 
214. For contemporary accounts of the Court's frantic attempt to find 
plausible grounds for reversal in each of the cases, see Monrad G. Paulsen, The 
Sit·in Cases of 1964: "But Answer Came There None," 1964 SUP. CT. REv. 137; 
Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit in Cases: Great Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. REv. 101. 
215. Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and EqUltl in Title to the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143, 162 
(1964). 
216. For example, according to Del Dickson, Justice Goldberg made the 
following statement to the conference: 
[I]f we allow public discrimination in public places, I am convinced that 
we will set back legislation indefinitely. . . . It would be a great 
disservice to the nation to decide this issue 5-4. There is legislation 
pending. The federal government's argument is not implausible. Rather 
than handing down a 5-4 decision Black's way [afflJ:ming the 
convictions], I think that it is better to put these cases off on t he ground 
urged by the United States, reversing them narrowly and not reaching 
the broad ground. 
Conference of October 26, 1963, in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985) 721, 722-23 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). 
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of the convictions, in Bell v. Maryland, 217 Justice Brennan circulated 
a draft dissent, observing that "[w]e of this Court ... are not so 
removed from the world around us that we can ignore the current 
debate over the constitutionality of [the Civil Rights Act] if enacted 
[and that] we cannot be blind to the fact that to day's opposing 
opinions ... will inevitably enter into and perhaps confuse that 
debate. ,,218 
Lucas A. Powe, one of the most astute observers ofthe Warren 
Court, details what happened next: 
Uustice Brennan] searched for a vote to flip the result .... 
[H]e concocted a reason to avoid the merits. He argued that 
the case should be sent back to the Maryland courts for 
them to consider the effect of a Baltimore ordinance and a 
state law each prohibiting discrimination in Baltimore 
restaurants. Both laws had been adopted after the Maryland 
court of appeals had affirmed Bell's conviction .... 
Normally an intervening state law, at best, would cause the 
Court to vacate rather than reverse convictions, but 
Brennan wanted a reversal, and he convinced Clark ... 'to 
desert.' •.• 
Brennan had won because he had refused to lose; Bell did 
not derail Congress; and sit-ins as a legal issue was behind 
the Court because henceforth there was a federal statutory 
prohibition against discrimination in places of public 
accommodation.219 
There is a sense, then, in which Justice Ginsburg is on target when 
217. 378 U.S. 226 (1964). 
218. BERNARDSCHW ARTZ, THEUNPUBIlSHEDOPINIONSOFTHEW ARREN 
COURT 187 (1985). 
219. LUCASA.POWE,]R., THEW ARRENCOURT ANDAMEruCANPOLITICS 
229 (2000). 
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she says that these cases must be read in context.220 But there is a 
more important sense in which the cases undercut her position. The 
cases show that at least some members of the Warren Court 
perceived themselves as bending ordinary principles of 
constitutional law when doing so was necessitated by 
countervailing moral and political imperatives.221 Nor were these 
the only instances where the Warren Court was guilty of this sin, 
if sin it be. The most famous example is Brown I'}. Board of 
Education.222 Here is how Powe, a strong defender of the result in 
Brown, describes the opinion: 
Where, using appropriate legal sources, is there justification 
for holding the Equal Protection Clause is violated by 
separate but equal? It couldn't be the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment without more-because while the text might 
easily be construed to say no discrimination, it would take 
some interpretation to move from no discrimin;ation to 
treating separate but equal as discrimination .... The next 
most likely source of reasoning would be to ask what those 
who created and adopted the Fourteenth Amf!ndment 
thought they were doing .... [But t]he history didn't show 
that [the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to bar 
segregation], and attempts to force it to do so would not 
persuade .... 
If ... the history of the Fourteenth Amendment was to 
be ignored, then the next best approach would be to rely on 
precedent. Since Plessy was obviously the dmnmant 
precedent, the Court would have to demonstrate ei1cher that 
Plessy was wrong when decided or that subsequent judicial 
220. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140-41 (2000) (Ginsburg,J., dissenting). 
221. As Michael Klarman puts it "[T]he only legal principle that Bouie stands 
for is that sometimes the Supreme Coun, for political reasons, will decide cases 
in a lawless fashion. In one sense, then, though not the one thl~ conservative 
Justices intended, Bouie was the perfect case for them to cite in Blish." Klarman, 
supra note 2, at 1741. 
222. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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developments had undermined its authority. In fact, the 
Court's decisions could support both these methods of 
attack, yet Warren eschewed both.223 
Of course, these criticisms of Brown are controversial.224 But what 
really matters is not that some academics find them persuasive. The 
important point is that distinguished members of the Court, who 
voted for Brown, were also persuaded. At least Justice Jackson and 
probably Justice Frankfurter believed that Brown was indefensible 
as a matter of constitutional law, but voted for the result anyway 
because of their strong belief that an end to legally enforced 
segregation was a political and moral imperative.225 
223. POWE, supra note 219, at 40-41. 
224. For two notable attempts to defend Brown on grounds other than those 
offered by the Court, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation 
Decisions, 69 YALEL.J. 421 (1960); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the 
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995). 
225. Jackson was explicit on the point. Here is how Del Dickson recounts 
his conference statement when the Court first considered the desegregation cases: 
This is a political question. To me personally, this is not a problem. But 
it is difficult to make this other than a political decision .... 
The problem is to make a judicial basis for a congenial political 
conclusion .... As a political decision, I can go along with it-but with 
a protest that it is politics. 
Conference of December 12, 1954, in The SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 654, 658. After the case was reargued, and when 
it was clear that a majority of the Court would vote to overturn segregation, 
Jackson prepared a draft which, according to Mark Tushnet, stated that he 
"'simply [could not] fmd in the conventional material of constitutional 
interpretation any justification for saying' that segregated education violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment," but nonetheless argued that "the erroneous 'factual 
assumption' that 'there were differences between the Negro and white races, 
viewed as a whole" justified the ending oflegal segregation. rUSHNET, supra note 
206, at 212-13. Justice Frankfurter's position was somewhat more ambiguous. 
At the initial conference on the desegregation cases, Dickson quotes Frankfurter 
as follows: 
I have read all of [the history of the Fourteenth Amendment] and I 
can't say that it meant to abolish segregation .... I don't see anything 
in the United States Code or in the equal protection clause on the basis 
of which such a decision could be made .... 
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Thus, when Justice Ginsburg uses Warren Court jurisprudence 
to attack the Bush majority for mixing politics with law, she is 
playing with fire. The Warren Court regularly mixed law with 
politics, and the Justices who served almost a half century ago 
would surely have understood, even if they might not h;ave publicly 
admitted, that there are times when law must be subservient to 
politics. Although some academics purport to be shocked -shocked 
- by this assertion, it should surprise no one. Even when legal 
[I] can't say that it is unconstitutional to treat a Negro differently 
than a white, but I would put all of these cases down for reargument. 
Conference of December 13, 1952, in The SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 646,651. It is possible, of course, that for these 
reasons Frankfurter would have voted to uphold segregation at this point, but 
changed his mind after reargument. But this hypothesis ignores Frankfurter's 
own assertion that he was prepared to strike down legal segregation after the first 
argument. See TU5HNET, supra note 206, at 194 (quoting letter from Frankfurter 
to Reed written three days after Brown was decided, stating "that if the cases had 
been decided during the 1952 Term, 'there would hav(~ been four 
dissenters-Vmson, Reed, Jackson and Clark'" Frankfurter pushed for 
reargument in Brown "for fear that the case would be decided 1he other way 
under Vinson.") Moreover, it is doubtful that anything happened between the 
first argument and the ultimate decision to change his mind. See Michael J. 
Klarman, Civil Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It M'ltter, 83 GEO. 
L.J. 433, 437 (1994) (expressing doubt that the focus on remedy or new research 
on original understanding of Fourteenth Amendment changed Frankfurter's 
views). 
Finally, there is some evidence that, even on the eve of the Court's decision 
in Brown, Frankfurter was still expressing the view that the decu:ion could not 
be justified on constitutional grounds. According to Justice Douglas' conference 
notes, at the conference on December 12, 1953, Frankfurter said the following: 
As a pure matter of history, in 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment did 
not have as its purpose to abolish segregation. The due process and equal 
protection clauses certainly did not abolish segregation when the 
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. The most that the history shows 
is that the matter was inconclusive. A host of legislation :?assed by 
Congress presupposes that segregation is valid. A host of legis lation and 
history in Congress and in this Court indicates that Plessy was right. 
Conference of December 12, 1952 in THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940-1985), supra note 216, at 657. But cf. TU5HNET, supra note 206, at 211 
(questioning whether Douglas quoted Frankfurter correctly). 
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principles are completely determinate, before one enforces them 
there is always an anterior question about whether one ought to do 
so. Law does not establish its own morality, and, although we 
would sometimes like to deny it, we always have the option to play 
the game by different rules. What else could Justice Jackson have 
meant when, in one of the most famous and revered Supreme 
Court opinions ever written, he stated that sometimes the result in 
a constitutional case should "depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories 
of law,,?226 Indeed, what else could Justice Scalia have meant when 
he confessed to being a "faint-heaned originalist"W and admitted 
that he could not "imagine [him]sel£, ,any more than any other 
federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of 
flogging" even if there were no constitutional warrant for striking 
it down?228 
Of course, the fact that there may be political reasons 
supponing the result in Bush v. Gore does not mean that there are 
good political reasons. Apan from raw panisanship, what nonlegal 
reasons might support the outcome? I can think of three 
interlocking arguments, each rooted in contemporary conservative 
thought, and each with some plausibility. 
First, there is the argument from formalism. Formalism 
emphasizes the virtue of rule-following, especially when the rules 
provide closure for a dispute that might otherwise go on 
indefinitely.229 Some liberal perfectionists want to root out every 
injustice by ignoring the rules whenever they fail to produce just 
outcomes. Conservatives appropriately remind us that traveling 
down this road risks chaos. This is true in pan because even bad 
226. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
aackson, J., concurring). 
227. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 849, 
864 (1989). 
228.Id. 
229. For defenses of this position, seeFREDERICKF. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY 
THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION 
MAKING IN LAW AND LIFE (1991); Larry Alexander, "WithMe,It'sAllerNuthin": 
Formalism in LawandMorality, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 530 (1999). 
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rules provide predictability, efficiency, and order. It is true as well 
because, in the absence of rules, individual discretion leads 
inevitably to abuse.230 
Thus, many conservatives favor contraction of habeas corpus 
rights for convicted prisoners because they understand that endless 
review will never wring out all errors from the criminal justice 
system and may introduce new ones.231 At some point the process 
must come to an end, especially in cases where the defendant has 
had a fair chance to raise his claims and has failed to do so because 
of inattention to the rules. 
Similarly, they oppose statistical readjustments of raw census 
data because even an arbitrary process is better than one that can be 
manipulated for political purposes.232 Perhaps statistical 
readjustmc;:nts would lead to a marginal improvement r.n accuracy, 
but once we allow any departure from the textually specified 
process, we run the risk of politically motivated departures.233 
And so, too, they opposed recounts in Florida be,:ause, in an 
230. I do not mean to suggest that liberals never see the virtues of formalism. 
Under the right conditions, liberals can be formalistic as well. For example, an 
earlier generation of liberals often defended free speech and fourth amendment 
rights by relying on formalism. For a discussion of the indeterminate political 
valence of formalism, see Kathleen M. Sullivan,Foreword: TheJustu:es ofRulesand 
Standards, 106 HARV. L. REv. 22 (1992). Still, in our present political culture, 
worries about the evils of unchecked discretion that might exist if rules could be 
ignored seem more associated with conservative thought. 
231. For the classic statement of this position, see Paul M. Bator, Finality in 
CriminalLawandFederalHabeasCorpusforStatePrisoners, 76 HARV. L. REv. 441 
(1963). 
232. See, e.g., L. Lynn Hogue, One for the Constitution: Censl'1S Move Right 
Under Law, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at A17 (quoting then Secretary of 
Commerce Robert Mosbacher as rejecting statistical adjustment of census because 
of "overriding concerns" about the "slippery slope" problem and the "potential 
for partisan manipulation"). 
233. It is not obvious why statistical adjustments, a fairly mechanical 
process, should be thought more susceptible to manipulation than in-person 
efforts, which inevitably involve some discretion. Still, I take consc:rvatives to be 
expressing a good-faith concern when they complain that once we depart from 
the seemingly bright-line requirement of an "actual enumeration," the risks of 
discretionary political decisions is unacceptable. 
HeinOnline -- 47 Wayne L. Rev. 1015 2001-2002
2001] OUR UNSEITLED ELECTION 1015 
election as close as this one, we could recount endlessly without 
ever removing all doubt,234 because the quixotic effort to do so is 
bound to introduce more doubt than it removes,235 and because 
such an effort is open to abuse and political manipulation.236 The 
televised pictures of politically appointed election officials holding 
individual ballots to the light perfectly captured these concerns. 
These worries, in tum, overlap with a second strand of 
conservative thought-the argument for personal responsibility. 
Once the rules are in place, on this view, people who fare poorly 
have no one to blame but themselves. This position is reflected in 
the defense of "meritocracy, ,,237 in the resistance of" effects" tests in 
equal protection jurisprudence,238 and in opposition to affirmative 
action239 and, more generally, to most forms of redistribution.240 H 
formalism reflects the view that even bad rules are better than no 
234. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 2 (arguing that "the presidential election 
of 2000 was a tie" and that "[i]n politics, as in all walks of life, it is sometimes 
necessary to have rules for breaking ties"). 
235. See, e.g., Andrew Ferguson, Who Are You CallingAngry?, TIME, Dec. 
18, 2000 ("Count the totals 10 times, and you will get 10 different results-first 
one winner, then another, and then the first one again."). 
236. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 2, at 662-63 (arguing that "[t]he officials 
counting dimpled chads . • . knew precisely which candidate would be 
advantaged ... [and] changed standards until they found the one that would 
produce the desired results" and that therefore there was a "federal interest in 
ensuring that state executive and judicial branches adhered to the rules for 
selecting electors established by the legislature, and do not use their interpretive 
and enforcement powers to change the rules after the fact"). 
237. Of course, conservatives are not alone in defending meritocracy. See, 
e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-
Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REv. 853 (1995). 
238. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Cf. Larry 
Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Preferences, 
Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 149,213 (1992)(arguingthat the fact 
that one is the victim of prior discrimination does not justify overlooking 
relevant traits when seeking best person to do job). 
239. See, e.g., Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative A ction, 34 WM. 
& MARy L. REv. 33 (1992). 
240. Seegenerally RICHARDA. EPSTEIN, T AKINGS:Pruv ATE PROPERTY AND 
TIlE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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rules at all, the personal responsibility argument captures the 
intuition that, in any event, the rules are not so bad. The people 
who are on top in some sense deserve to be on top. They are, after 
all, the ones who played by the rules and won "fair and square." 
People who are not on top could be if only they used the same rules 
to their advantage. Hence, bending of the rules for the sake of 
sentimental liberal conceptions of social justice provides perverse 
incentives that reward sloth, a culture of victimization, and interest 
group politics.241 
This view is also right beneath the surface in Bush v. Gore. As 
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out, the rules for marking ballots 
were prominently posted.242 What he did not say, but might have, 
is that anyone not intelligent enough to be able to follow these 
simple directives is also not intelligent enough to vote 
responsibly.243 Perhaps these people should not he formally 
disfranchised, but neither should we distort the system to 
accommodate them. Hence, people who mismarked thdr ballots or 
left hanging chads, hardly deserve our sympathy, much less the 
dismantling of the entire system to meet their needs. 
Finally, both these concerns are linked to a third conservative 
position-the argument from judicial supremacy. It m::~y seem odd 
241. See, e.g., CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL 
POllCY, 1950-1980 (1984). 
242. As noted above, however, he apparently exaggerated the extent to 
which this was true. See supra pp. 1001-02. 
243. This view is reflected in Justice O'Connor's evident ann.oyance when 
counsel for Vice President Gore attempted to explain the mistakes that voters 
had made: 
MR. BOIES: Another, another thing that they counted was he said they 
discerned what voters sometimes did was instead of properly putting 
the ballot in where it was supposed to be, they laid it on top, and then 
what you would do is you would fmd the punches went not through 
the so-called chad, but through the number. 
QUESTION: Well, why isn't the standard the one that voters are 
instructed to follow, for goodness sakes? I mean, it couldn't be clearer. 
I mean, why don't we go to that standard? 
Oral Argument of David Boies at 56-57, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 
00-949). 
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to identify this as a conservative position. At least in the recent 
past, conservatives have attempted to assume the mantle of judicial 
restraint.244 Even now, conservatives have appropriated the rhetoric 
of judicial restraint, but if one looks to actions rather than words, 
Rehnquist Court decisions are better explained by an older 
conservative tradition that sees courts as the primary bulwark 
against the unprincipled disorder that is the hallmark of the 
political process. According to this older view, democratic politics 
is the locus for the unprincipled exercise of power. Courts, in 
contrast, enforce the rules that protect individuals from 
government encroachment. This attitude is reflected in current 
conservative enthusiasm for judicial protection of property rights,245 
the equal protection rights of white men,246 and free speech 
rights.247 It has become especially salient in the Court's new 
federalism jurisprudence, which has totally abandoned the practice 
of judicial deference towards congressional judgments and replaced 
it with pervasive disdain for political outcomes.248 
Notwithstanding the Court's transparently disingenuous claim 
that it was forced into the dispute, the assertion of judicial 
supremacy is also at the heart of Bush v. Gore. The Court might 
have allowed the political process to run its course. We can only 
speculate why it chose not to do so, but one reason may have been 
the same concerns that explain its intervention elsewhere. Any 
political resolution of the 2000 election would have been 
disorderly, protracted, and unprincipled. Far better, the justices 
244. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POllTICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
245. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 503 U.S. 1003 (1992); NoHan v. California Coastal 
Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825 {1987}. 
246. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City 
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
247. See, e.g.) Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly, 121 S. Ct. 2404 (2001); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
248. See, e.g.) Board of Trustees ofUniv. of Alabama v. Garret, 531 U.S. 356 
(2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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might have thought, to resolve the matter cleanly through legal 
processes that are governed by reason rather than power.249 
Are these good reasons that justify the result that the Court 
reached? I certainly don't think so, but I must admit that my views 
about them reflect no more than my own political commitments. 
I have tried to be concise in setting forth these reasons, and I worry 
that I may have presented caricatured versions of them. Let me be 
clear, then, that I do not mean to be dismissive. Although I believe 
these arguments to be seriously flawed, they are not outside the 
bounds of rational discourse. They reflect a widely held set of views 
defended by sensible people who are neither monsters nor lunatics. 
That is, after all, about the most that we can expect opponents of 
the Warren Court to concede about the political judgments that 
motivated it. As a (sometime) defender of the Warren Court, it ill 
behooves me to insist on higher standards for the Rehnquist Court. 
Thus if we are looking for an apolitical answer to our question 
"what's so bad about Bush v. Gore," it cannot be that the decision 
was motivated by these reasons, anymore than it m;ikes sense to 
claim that the decision is wrong because it led to ::l Republican 
administration. From a particular political perspective, the case 
seems wrongly decided, but from a different political perspective, 
which cannot be dismissed out of hand, the result is eminently 
sensible. 
Still, it might be claimed that what's bad about Bush v. Gore is 
not the reasons themselves, but the Court's disingenuousness about 
its reasons. H the Justices really were motivated by a set of 
defensible concerns, why did they fail to articulate them? The 
answer, I think, is that a candid assertion of these r(:asons in the 
context of Bush v. Gore would have laid bare a contra.diction. 
Formalism, personal responsibility, and judicial supremacy are 
all efforts to make sense of the Official Story. They aU express the 
ideal of an apolitical settlement of the questions that c~vide us. But 
the Official Story cannot, in tum make sense of Bush v. Gore. The 
249. Cj Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 695, 
697 (2001) (characterizing the dispute between the justices in terms of "whether 
democracy means order and structure or chaos and tumult"). 
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problem is that in the name of formal rule-following, the Court 
itself broke the rules. As I have argued above, the Court's decision 
is simply indefensible in terms of the standard rules of 
constitutional interpretation. A commitment to formal rule-
following therefore cannot justify the outcome. Moreover, if the 
rules were broken, then it cannot be, as the personal responsibility 
argument claims, that people who obeyed the rules deserved what 
they got. And since the argument from judicial supremacy rests on 
the supposed willingness of courts to obey the rules, this position 
collapses as well. Put differently, the most plausible defense of Bush 
v. Gore is that the Court appropriately relied upon political, rather 
than legal judgments. But this defense will not work if, as I believe, 
the political judgments were, themselves, grounded in assertions 
about the importance of legality. What's bad about Bush v. Gore, 
then, is not that the decision is either "law" or "politics," but that 
the Court tried to have it both ways. The political judgments 
providing best defense of the decision argue for the exclusion of 
political judgments. 
B. Toward an Unsettled Constitution 
The only way out of this contradiction is to abandon the 
Official Story. Recall that standard constitutionalism rests on the 
assumption that there is a single agreement or settlement on the 
metalevel and that courts are able to reason from this agreement to 
settle disagreements on the ordinary, political level. Because the 
Court embraced this assumption, it was led to the logical 
contradictions set out above. Bush v. Gore demonstrates that the 
Official Story cannot work because disagreements on the metalevel 
replicate disagreements on the political level. To be sure, if 
everyone agreed on a particular constitutional methodology-say, 
some version of nonpolitical, constitutional originalism-and if this 
sort of originalism led to determinate outcomes, we might use this 
agreement to settle our disputes. But Bush v. Gore demonstrates 
that, whatever they claim, not even the justices, much less every 
one else, agree on originalism or on any other nonpolitical 
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methodology. Whatever the justices said, the result in Bush v. Gore 
is explicable only on the basis of plausible, but eminently 
contestable, political commitments to formalism, personal 
responsibility, and judicial supremacy. 
The Court's belief in a settlement theory, in turn, leads to the 
disingenuousness that is the least attractive feature of the majority 
and concurring opinions. Because the justices believe that they act 
legitimately only when they rely on apolitical principles, they have 
to pretend that such principles uncontroversially resolve the case. 
Because they think that their role is to settle the election, they have 
to insist that constitutional morality obligates the losers to accept 
their defeat.25o 
But there is an alternative to settlement theory and to the 
transparently make-believe world that it generates. The beginning 
of wisdom is to accept some obvious truths: of course, the outcome 
in Bush v. Gore is political. It is not the merest coincidence that in 
this, and countless other cases, Justice Scalia, a conservative 
Republican, finds principles congenial to the Republican party 
embedded in the Constitution, while Justice Ginsburg, a liberal 
Democrat, finds Democratic principles embedded in the same 
document. And of course, for this very reason, we c;mnot expect 
the Court's decision to settle the argument about the election. 
Constitutional law replicates, rather than settles, our disagreements. 
One might suppose that the recognition of these facts should 
cause the Court to defer to the political branche.s. If judicial 
decisions are inevitably political, then why should unelected judges 
be involved at all?251 Perhaps they should not be. There is no doubt 
that judicial review has some legitimating tendencies, and, there are 
disturbing indications that the Court may have succeeded in using 
the veneer of legal neutrality to legitimate the outcome of the 
election of 2000. Although some celebrate this fact, for reasons 
250. C[. Michelman, supra note 5, at 692 (arguing th~lt the Court's 
assumption that obedience to its orders "depends on the country's belief that 
whatever the Court rules, it rules for reasons of law" might have led it "to act for 
reasons other than the very ones it announces.") 
251. See Dorf & Issacharoff, supra note 6; Calabresi, supra note 2. 
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argued below, I believe that this ability to settle appropriately 
contestable . political disputes makes judicial intervention 
profoundly problematic. 
Still, there are two responses to the seemingly attractive 
argument for judicial restraint. First, the argument oversimplifies 
the dilemma that the Court faced. Perhaps it would be better, as 
Mark Tushnet has recently argued/52 if the Court routinely 
remitted important constitutional questions to the political 
branches. In a culture where there was a long standing expectation 
that courts would rarely or never involve themselves in political 
disputes, the possibility of abstention might be meaningful. But, for 
better or worse, that is not our culture. In a country like ours, 
where judicial review is already a prominent feature of our politics, 
deference will seem like only one of several possibilities. 
As soon as this is true, the decision to defer is, itself, a kind of 
intervention. In a world where judicial intervention is a real option, 
a decision to remain passive is, itself, a choice that has politically 
predictable consequences and that requires defense. Once the 
decision is seen in this way, then the Court is again confronted with 
the problem of reasonable political disagreement. 
For example, Professor Tushnet makes no secret of the fact that 
his opposition to judicial power is linked to a series of substantive 
political commitments.253 A person with different political 
commitments, or a different view about how favorably a court will 
view those commitments, might have a different position about 
judicial intervention. Similarly, people with different political 
commitments disagreed about whether the 2000 election should be 
settled by the political branches. Moreover, even if we restrict our 
attention to those who favored such a settlement, these people 
were, themselves, divided between those favoring a settlement by 
the Florida legislature and those favoring a settlement by the 
United States Congress. The meaning of democracy, itself, is 
contested in our political culture. Therefore, even a Court 
252. See MARKV. TUSHNET, TAKINGTIIECONSTITUTIONAWAYFROMTHE 
COURTS (1999). 
253. See id. at 129-153. 
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committed to respect for democracy would have to decide which 
democratic outcome merited respect. The Court had to do 
something when confronted with these disagree:ments, and 
anything it did, including doing nothing at all, would reflect a 
contestable, political judgment. 
There is a sense, then, in which judicial power is defensible 
simply because it is inevitable, at least in a political culture where 
judicial review is already well established. Given this inevitability, 
we are forced to confront the question of how to make the best of 
what judges do. Here, we come to a second argument for judicial 
intervention-an argument that tries to imagine how the use of 
judicial power might promote a true community based upon 
reasonable consent. 
As already noted, the Official Story assumes that such a 
community can be fashioned on the basis of a politically neutral 
constitutional settlement, which all reasonable people can be . 
expected to endorse. Suppose instead we c.onceptualize 
constitutional law as a means of unsettling political resolutions. 
After all, in a diverse culture where agreement on c()nstitution~l 
methodology continues to elude us, constitutional settlements are 
inevitably exclusionary. They produce losers whose loss is 
experienced as something more than a mere political setback. 
Instead, a constitutional loss is said to be rooted in the constitutive 
principles of the community. Settlements of this kind are bound to 
leave losers nursing serious grievances, and such grievances make 
difficult the kind of consent upon which a just community must be 
founded. 
None of this is to say that we don't require settlements of some 
son. No one claims that it would be good for the country for two 
people to hold competing inaugural parades on January 20. But 
precisely because most of us understand that settlement is good for 
the country, we can usually rely on ordinary political processes to 
bring it about. The appropriate role for constitutional law is not to 
settle disputes, but to systematically unsettle political .outcomes by 
providing losers with rhetorical resources that they can utilize to 
attack settlements on the one hand while evincing their 
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commitment to core community values on the other. 
Constitutional rhetoric is both indeterminate, and uniquely 
powerful in our culture. This combination allows everyone to use 
it to advance their position. Critics of liberal constitutionalism have 
long attacked it for this reason, but in fact, the combination of 
indeterminacy and power is liberal constitutionalism's greatest 
strength. This is so because if we are to expect losers to accept their 
loss while remaining within the community, then we need to 
provide them with a way of continuing the argument. 
Conceptualized in this fashion, constitutional law allows dissenters 
to dispute political outcomes from within the community, rather 
than attacking it from without. 
Thus, judicial intervention is justifiable to the extent that courts 
use the rhetoric of liberal constitutionalism in a fashion that opens 
up political argument. To be sure, a court that understood 
constitutional law in this way would resolve the dispute before it 
and would do so utilizing the standard tools of constitutional 
argument, including text, tradition, precedent, moral reasoning, and 
policy analysis. But it would do so while also candidly 
acknowledging that a different court, with different background 
political commitments, could use the same tools to reach a different 
outcome. Such an acknowledgment would invite losers to 
participate in continued dialogue, even as the case is decided against 
them. It builds community by acknowledging that the entailments 
of even our deepest commitments are appropriately and radically 
contestable. 
What's bad about Bush v. Gore, then, is that none of the justices 
wrote an opinion that remotely approaches these requirements. 
Both the majority and the dissenting justices made the mistake of 
supposing that the Court's legitimacy stemmed from its ability to 
articulate a set of apolitical principles to which all Americans owe 
allegiance. The majority thought (or at least pretended to think) 
that these principles gave it the right to settle the election, while the 
dissent thought that the majority's abuse of the principles 
squandered its legitimacy. Both sides are sadly mistaken. The 
Supreme Court has no warrant to shut down political disputes. 
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Constitutional law best serves the ends of community when it 
opens up, rather than closes down, political argument. Nor should 
the Supreme Court's prestige depend upon its politic;al neutrality. 
Instead, it earns that prestige when it utilizes concepts and a 
yocabulary that are sufficiently open-textured to allow the losers, 
using the same concepts and vocabulary, to claim that the Court's 
decision is wrong. 
I wish that the justices understood all of this and stopped 
pretending that only their disinterested statesmanship stands 
between the country as we know it and a war of all against all. To 
the extent that the Court has persuaded the country that this is 
true, its decision provides a powerful argument fo:r those who 
oppose judicial review. 
Suppose, though that we want to make the best, rather than the 
worst, of Bush v. Gore. Oddly, the strength of the unsettled 
constitution is apparent even when the Court abuses its powers. 
The beauty of unsettlement theory is that it works, at least to some 
extent, even when the justices are trying to prevent it from 
working. 
Thus, it remains unclear whether the Court has succeeded in 
shutting down debate about the election. True, George Bush is now 
the President and many Americans seem eager to move on. But 
given the constellation of political forces in Congress and the 
Florida legislature (not to mention the results on the ground in 
Florida), a Bush presidency was the likely outcome in any event. 
Moreover, if unsettlement theory is to work at all, it cannot work 
on the level of the individual case. Whenever the Court makes a 
decision, there is a sense in which it settles the case before it. H it 
functions at all, unsettlement theory, works on a broader canvass. 
Often it unsettles entire areas of law, like the appropriate division 
between public and private spheres, but it can also function in the 
context of more discrete disputes, like the election of 2000. In this 
context, it allows losers to continue the war despite losing a battle. 
True, there is no prospect of disposing George Bush a:; President in 
the same sense that there is a prospect of, say, overruling Roe v. 
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Wade.254 Still, when the Supreme Court made George Bush 
President, it handed his opponents a set of potent rhetorical tools 
that have the potential to make his victory seem illegitimate and so 
weaken him politically.255 Because of the Supreme Court, Gore's 
defeat has become something more than a mere political setback. 
Instead, it can be portrayed as a constitutional outrage. This is so 
because liberal constitutionalism has an existence that is 
independent of the Supreme Court. The Court has had its say, and 
now it is the tum of Bush's opponents to have theirs. They, too, 
can invoke the empty claims of constitutional neutrality to attack 
the Court and the outcome that it produced. 
Moreover, on a broader scale, Bush v. Gore has the potential to 
change the Official Story. At least for a time, it is going to be 
difficult for most Americans to take seriously the Court's defenders 
when they speak with pompous sanctimony about neutral 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Even if nothing else is 
accomplished, temporary freedom from pompous sanctimony is no 
small benefit. The risk, of course, is that sanctimony will be 
replaced by cynicism. But although this outcome is certainly 
possible, it is not inevitable. Instead of bemoaning the politicization 
of constitutional law, we might come to celebrate the open texture 
of a set of commitments that allows people motivated by 
contradictory and irreconcilable substantive views to speak a 
common language. Indeed, perhaps even the justices themselves will 
come to see that they can be authoritative without being 
authoritarian and that the best version of judicial review promotes, 
rather than settles, political argument. 
Is this optimism warranted? An unsettled constitution provides 
tools that political actors can utilize, but it provides no guarantee 
of success. Perhaps in the long run the Court's decision will be seen 
as wise and the Bush administration as wholly legitimate. Perhaps 
the Court will manage to hold onto its Olympian position as the 
neutral expositor of supreme law. But there are also other 
254.410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
255. I make no claim here as to how effective his opponents have been in 
using those tools. 
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possibilities. It is important that, within days of the Court's 
decision, the "Reelect Gore" bumper stickers began to appear, that 
within weeks, newly energized interest groups began attempting to 
guarantee access to the ballot and preparing for the m~xt Supreme 
Court confirmation fight, and that within months the Senate began 
hearings on the appropriate consideration of ideology in the 
appointment of Supreme Court Justices. 
So what's so bad about Bush v. Gore? Just maybe it'!; not so bad, 
after all. Even as the Court settled the election, it provided tools 
that we can use to unsettle the country. It remains to be seen 
whether we will seize this opportunity, but for those of us who 
were defeated in the disputed election of 2000, things surely could 
have been worse. 
